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QUES'I_ON PRESENTED
In a prior decision in this case, YamahaMotor Corp. v.
Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), this Court held that state law
could provide a remedy for wrongful death in the territorial
waters &the United States caused by ajet ski manufactured by
Yamaha. In footnote 14, the Court expressly left open the
issues of whether state or federal law determined Yamaba's
liability, and if state law governed, which state's laws would
apply. After a decision on those issues by the Third Circuit, the
question now presented is:
In a state law based claim arising out of the death of a 12
year old girl who was riding a jet ski, does the fact that there is
admiralty as well as diversity jurisdiction require the federal
court to apply federal substantive law and choice of law rules as
to issues of liability and compensatory and punitive damages,
where the claim is based on defects in the design and
manufacture of the jet ski and not on any conduct that took
place in the territorial waters where the death occurred?
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P.A_'_S

TO TH_ PROCEEDING

All parties to the proceeding are listed in the caption of
the petition.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Third Circuit is reported at 216 F.3d
338 (3d Cir. 2000) and is set forth in the Appendix to the
petition at App. A1-A34. The opinion of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is
reported at 40 F. Supp. 2d 288 (ED. Pa. 1999) and is set forth
at App. A35-A56. The order denying rehearing and rehearing
en bane is not reported, but is set forth at App. A57-A58. The
opinion of this Court when this case was previously before this
Court is reported at 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
STATEMENT

OF ,TUII_..IISII_CT_ION

The opinion of the Third Circuit was issued on June 23,
2000. The petition for rehearing en bane was denied by order
dated August 1, 2000. This Court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).
RELEVANT

STATUTE

Section 1333(1) of Title 28 provides:
The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
STATEMENT

OF TEIE CASE

This is a wrongful death action filed by Lucien and
Robin Calhoun to recover damages for the death of their 12 year
old daughter Natalie, who was killed in an accident resulting
from a collision between the "Wavejammer" jet ski on which she
was riding and a vessel anchored in the territorial waters of
Puerto Rico. The Calhouns, who are citizens of Pennsylvania,
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sued Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd., the manufacturer of the
Wavejammer, which is incorporated and has its principal place
of business in Japan, and Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A.,
its distributing arm in the United States, which is incorporated
and has its pnncipal place of business in California. As noted
above, this case has previously been before this Court, with the
Yamaha defendants as petitioners and the Calhouns as
respondents. Because the positions of the parties in this Court
are now reversed, and since this petition will refer to the prior
opinion and the decision below, the petition will use the names
"Calhouns" and "Yamaha" instead of petitioner and respondent.
The Calhouns' complaint was filed on June 27, 1990,
seeking both compensatory and punitive damages under
Pennsylvania's wrongful death and survival statutes, 42 Pa.
Cons. Star. Ann. §§ 8301-2 (West 1995). It asserts various
theories of liability resulting from defects in the design and
manufacture of the Wavejammer, none of which occurred in
Puerto Rico. Subject matter jurisdiction was alleged based on
28 U.S.C § 1332 (diversity) and § 1333(1) (admiralty).
The first voyage to this Court began when Yamaha
moved for partial summary judgment on the theory that the
decision inMorange v. StatesMarine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375
(1970), which recognized a federal cause of action for wrongful
death in territorial waters, caused by an unseaworthy vessel,
eliminated state law based claims for wrongful death. The
district court granted that motion in pan but allowed the
Caihouns to take an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b). The Third Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed in
part, but its principal ruling was that non-seamen such as the
Calhouns could maintain a state law wrongful death action
despiteMorange. 40 F.3d 622 (1994). Yamaha then obtained
review in this Court, and after _11 briefing and argumem, the
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Courtunanimously
Affirmed
theholding
that
theCalhouns'
state
lawwrongful
death
claim
couldproceed.
Becausemuch ofthis
Court's
reasoning
bearsdirectly
ontheissues
presented
inthis
petition,
we review
thatdecision
insomedetail.
Yamaha'sposition
inthis
Courtwas thatMorange had
created
a uniformfederal
causeofaction
forwrongful
deaths
occurring
instate
territorial
watersthatoustedallstate
law
remedies.516 U.S.at209. Inrejecting
thatargument,
the
Courtreviewed
thecases
leading
uptoMorange,including
The
Harrisburg,
199US. 199(1886),
whichhadheldthatthere
was
no federal
wrongfuldeathcauseof actionapplicable
to
territorial
waters
andwas overruled
byMorange.Id at206-II.
The Courtnotedthat,
despite
TheHarrisburg,
state
wrongful
deathclaims
hadalways
beenallowed
toproceed,
id at206-07,
and thatitwas thelackofa uniformfederal
remedybasedon
claimsofunseaworthiness
thatcausedtheMorange Courtto
overrule
The Harrisburg.
Id.at211. Thus,theCourtmade
clearthattheimpetusforcreating
a federal
wrongfuldeath
causeofaction
interritorial
waters
wasnotananomalyresulting
from the application
of state
law,but rather
theanomalies
arising
from theabsenceof a maritime
causeofactionfor
wrongful
deathbasedon unseaworthiness,
which,
by then,
had
becomethedominant
basis
formaritime
torts.
Id.at211-13.
The Courtalsorejected
Yamaha'spleaforfederal
uniformity,
contrasting
casesinvolving
non-seafarers,
suchas
Natalie
Calhoun,
whosefights
Congress
hadnotprescribed
in
legislation
(other
thanfordeaths
on thehighseas),
withthose
involving
seamenandlongshore
andharbor
workers,
forwhom
Congress had established
elaborate
and comprehensive
compensation
schemes.Id at215. On thatbasis,
this
Court
affirmed
theruling
of theThirdCircuit
thattheCalhouns'
wrongful
death
andsurvival
claims
basedonPennsylvania
state
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law were not displaced by the federal remedy for wrongful death
based on unseaworthiness recognized in Morange. In its final
footnote, the Court specifically recognized that the issues of
whether federal or state law would govern the standards for
imposing liability, and, if state law applied, whether the law
would be that of Pennsylvania or Puerto Rico, would have to be
resolved on remand. Id at 216 n. 14.
The case was sent back to the district court, which
concluded that the law of Pennsylvania applied to claims for
compensatory damages, but that the law of Puerto Rico applied
to both punitive damages and issues of liability. App. A42-A44,
A49-A51.
The district court again certified its order for
interlocutory appeal, and the Third Circuit agreed to review it.
As a threshold matter, the panel (none of whom sat on the prior
appeal) decided that the question of whether to apply federal,
rather than state, choice of law rules was comrolled by the
existence of admiralty jurisdiction in this case. App. A10.
Because there was indisputably subject matter jurisdiction based
on diversity of citizenship, the court's opinion, written by Judge
Gartk, acknowledged that ordinarily the court would apply the
choice of law rules ofthe forum state, here Pennsylvania. App.
Ag. In addition, the court of appeals stated that this Court's
prior holding had relied on state law, which "suggests that the
present matter falls outside of our admiralty jurisdiction." App.
A11. However, the court of appeals believed that, ffthis claim
fell within the admiralty jurisdiction, as construed in this Court's
recem decisions, it was bound to disregard both the state law
basis of the claim and the existence of diversity jurisdiction and
to apply federal choice of law principles. App. A1 l-A14. The
court then concluded that this accident was within the admiralty
jurisdiction - a holding that the Calhouns do not challenge
because it should have no effect on the proper choice of law and applied federal choice of law rules to this case. App. A14.
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After concluding that the fact that the accidem occurred
in Puerto Rico was not "fortuitous" as that term has been used
in choice of law cases, App. A17-A19, the court determined that
the laws of Pennsylvania would apply to claims for
compensatory damages since Pennsylvania had the most
significant interest in assuring that the Calhouns were properly
compensated. App. A19. As to punitive damages, however, the
court found that Puerto Rico had the dominant interest because
the accident occurred there, App. A19-A20, although the
defects relied on by the Caihouns were embedded in the jet ski
long before it arrived or was used in Puerto Rico and would
have rendered the jet ski defecftve regardless of where it was
operated.
Finally, the opinion turned to the issue of what
substantive law would govern liability. If, as Yamaha argued,
federal law applied, Yamaha would be permitted to seek to
reduce the damages to be awarded the Calhouns by showing
that Natalie was herself negligent, a defense that would not be
allowed if the ease were tried under Pennsylvania law. App. A5
n.4, A21 n.16. The court of appeals recognized this Court's
apparent reliance on state law in its prior decision in this very
ease, as well as the many other decisions relying on state law,
but it nonetheless concluded that the federal interest in
uniformity demanded that federal maritime law, not
Pennsylvania law, be used to determine Yamaha's liability. App.
A25-A27.
In so ruling, the court did not identify any
substantive maritime law, regulation, or policy that would be
undermined if state law applied, nor did the court appear to
consider that the issue of interference with federal law had any
place in its analysis.
Judge Nygaard dissented as to punitive damages only.
App. A29. He did not challenge the majority's reliance on
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admiralty jurisdiction to determine the applicable choice of law
principles, nor did he disagree that federal substantive maritime
law had to govern this Pennsylvania wrongful death claim: his
disagreement was over how to apply federal choice of law rules
to this case. Judge Ny_ard concluded that Puerto Rico had no
interest in applying its laws on punitive damages - which make
punitive damages unavailable in this situation - where the
wrongfulconductalleged
bytheCalhounsoccurred
inJapan.
App.A30-A32.
A petition
forrehearing
enbancwas denied
on August
I,2000,withChiefJudgeBecker,who had written
thefirst
opinion
inthis
case,
andJudgeAmbro,dissenting.
App.A57A58.
REASONS FOR GRANTU_G THE W_T
The petition should be granted because it satisfies each
of the criteria set forth in Rule 10 of the Rules of this Court:
(A) the petition presents an important question of federal law
that has not been, but should be, decided; (B) the analysis
employed by the Third Circuit in reaching its decision is in direct
conflict with the analysis used by other courts of appeals facing
similar issues; and (C) the principles of law on which the Third
Circuit based its decision are in conflict with principles that this
Court has set forth in a number of applicable rulings.
A. The Question Is Important and Unresolved
In its prior decision in this very case, the Court declined
to decide the choice of law questions that the Third Circuit
resolved adversely to the Calhouns:
We thus reserve for another day reconciliation of
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the maritime personal injury decisions that
r_ected state substantive liability standards, and
the maritime wrongful-death cases in which state
law has held sway. Compare Kermarec [v.
Compagnie General Transatlantique,] 358 U.S.
[625,] 628 [(1959)] (personal injury); Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 US. 406 (1953)
(same), with Hess v. United States, 361 U.S.
314, 319 (1960) (wrongful death); The Tungus
v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 592-594 (1959)

(same).
516 U.S. at 216 n.14. And in a portion of footnote 14
preceding this quotation, the Court specifically recognized that
the remaining issues included "whether Pennsylvania's
wrongful-death remedies or Puerto Rico's apply" and what is
the "source - federal or state - of the standards governing
liability, as distinguished from the rules on remedies."
Accordingly, today is that "[]other day" that the Court
envisioned would occur, and the issue of whether the Third
Circuit was correct in applying both federal substantive law
principles and federal choice of law rules to the issues of liability
and compensatory
and punitive damages under Pennsylvania's
wrongful death statute, is clearly and directly presented.
The issue presented is also important.
Recreational
boating of various kinds is an extremely popular activity in the
United States; it is also a dangerous one. The United States
Coast Guard maintains statistics and issues an annual report on
boating accidents, most recently for 1998. U.S. Department of
Transportation,
United States Coast Guard, Boating Statisacs
- 1998, COMDTPUB P16754.12 <http://www.uscgboatingorg
/saf/pdff/Boating_Statistics_1998pd_.
In 1998, there were
more than 12 million boats covered by the report, id at 23, of
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which 11,368 were involved in an accident of some kind. ld. at
31. Yamaha's Wavejammer appears to be classified as a
"personal watercraft," id at 42, and there were 3,607 accidents
for such vessels, in which 78 people died and 1743 were injured,
id at 31, of whom 1182 were admitted to a hospital. Id. at 22.
See also Amy Argetsinger, Deaths Rise as More People Ride
the Waves, Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1995, at A1 (reporting
56 jet ski deaths in 1994 alone); Jon Nordheimer, Watercraft
Stir aMix of lrritation and Thrills,N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1995,
at 31 (same).
The Coast Guard report does not speak directly to
whether the accidents occurred within the navigable waters of
the United States, where admiralty jurisdiction would probably
lie, or in non-navigable
waters, such as a landlocked lake, a
man-made reservoir, or a shallow stream or creek. Instead, the
report breaks down the accident data by the type of body of
water on which the accident took place, some of which - such
as "OceardCmlf, Great Lakes" and "Bays, inlets, sounds,
harbors" - are almost certainly navigable waters.
U.S.
Department of Transportation, supra, at 38. For 1998, On those
bodies of water, for all types of boats, there were 1457
accidents and 144 fatalities. There were also a total 5593
accidents, which produced 622 fatalities, on the two categories
listed as "Rivers, streams, creeks" and "Lakes, ponds,,
reservoirs, dams, gravel pits" - many of which are presumably
non-navigable waters.
These statistics make two points about the importance
of the issues presented. First, there are a great many accidents
involving personal watercraft, a substantial but indeterminate
number of which are likely to have occurred on navigable
waters. For each of them (and perhaps for other non-boating
accidents that occur on such waters), there is a question as to
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the applicability of federal or state law. Second, given these
statistics, it seems almost certain that there are a substantial
number of boating accidents involving personal watercraft:, such
as the Wavejammer, that occur on non-navigable waters as to
which there is no basis for admiraky jurisdiction, and hence only
state law can apply. Thus, if the court of appeals is correct in
applying federal law because there is admiralty jurisdiction in
this case, an identicaljet ski accident occurring on inland waters,
alleging the same defects, would be decided under state law,
even though the conduct forming the basis for liability almost
certainly occurred in Japan or on some other land-based
location. The notion that the same conduct, involving the same
product, could be judged under federal standards if the death
occurred on navigable waters, and under a different standard if
the accident took place on a landlocked lake, provides another
reason why this case presents an important, unresolved question
that this Court should decide.
Commentators who have examined the choice of law
questions after the prior decision in this case recognize the need
to clarify the questions left open in footnote 14. The most
comprehensive article is Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea,
67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 273 (1999), which surveys this Court's
decisions and urges a narrow role for federal law when a
plaintiff chooses to rely on state law. The author not only
argues for a result quite different from what the court of appeals
.held here, but also makes clear that the law in this area is badly
m need of clarification.
Another admiralty expert also decries
the confusion, to the point where he asserts that "all of the
theories various commentators
have developed in efforts to
synthesize this body of jurisprudence are untenable," not
because his colleagues are incapable of reasoned analysis, but
because he concludes that the decisions are so conflicting as to
require this Court's attention to straighten out the law. David
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A. Robertson, Symposium: Federalism and Uniformity in
Maritime Law: The ApplicabiliOJ of State Law in Maritime
Cases After YamahaMotor Corp.v. Calhoun, 21 Mar. Law 81,
95 (1996). In short, this petition presents an important question
that commands this Court's attention.
B.

The Circuits Are Divided on the Governing
Principles To Be Applied.

We acknowledge that this case does not present a classic
division in the circuits over a pure question of law (such as the
interpretation of a statute). Nor is the result in this ease
inconsistent with the result in another ease involving the same
or even similar facts. Rather, it is the method of analysis that
the Third Circuit used to decide these questions that is directly
at odds with the methods used by other courts of appeals in
these kinds of eases. Unless resolved by this Court, the lower
courts will continue adri_ in this area of the law.
The touchstone of the Third Circuit's decision is its
ruling that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
because this is an admiralty case and that, as a result, federal
law, rather than state law, applies. We do not quarrel with the
conclusion that there is admiralty jurisdiction,
although that
ruling was wholly unnecessary since there is admitted diversity
of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000, as 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires.
But the
conclusion that, because there was admiralty jurisdiction, federal
law must be used, even though the claim is based on
Pennsylvania's
wrongful death statute, is in direct conflict with
the way that other courts of appeals have treated the relevance
of subject matter jurisdiction when the issue is whether state or
federal law applies to a death or injury occurring on navigable
waters.
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There are two separate aspects of the ruling below that
are inconsistent with decisions fi-om other circuits. First, the
Third Circuit gave talismanic significance for choice of law
purposes to its conclusion that the ease was within the district
court's admiraltyjurisdiction, but other courts of appeals, post°
Yamaha, have recognized that, even as to maritime matters,
subject matter jurisdiction does not determine whether federal
or gate law applies. For example, in In re Amtrak "'Sunset
Ltd." Tram Crash, 121 F.3d 1421 (llth Cir. 1997), a
commercial tug was towing six barges in state waters when it
struck a bridge that carried a train, causing many deaths and
injuries, as well as considerable property damage, in what was
admittedly an "admiralty action." Id. at 1422. In contrast to
what the Third Circuit did here, the Eleventh Circuit applied
state law except with respect to two aspects of the claims where
state law was in direct conflict with established principles of
maritime law: Alabama law allows punitive damages on a
showing of simple negligence in death actions, whereas maritime
law requires a higher degree of wrongdoing, and maritime law
requires apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors,
which Alabama prohibits. Id at 1423. While the Eleventh
Circuit rejected the applicability of state law on those two
issues, it did so because "substantive admiralty law rights are
being threatened," id at 1426, and not simply because there was
admiralty subject matter jurisdiction, as the Third Circuit held
here, without even an inquiry as to whether the application of
state law would harm federal maritime interests.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Wellsv. Liddy, 186 F:3d
505 (1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 939 (2000), is even more
in conflict since it ascribes no significance to subject matter
jurisdiction.
Among the claims in that case was one for
defamation based on statements made by the defendant, one of
which occurred while defendant was giving a lecture on a cruise
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ship in the Mediterranean. Under the approach taken by the
Third Ckcuit, the court in Wells would first have had to decide
whether there was admiralty jurisdiction before ruling on choice
of law issues. But the Fourth Circuit, correctly in our view, did
not even decide the jurisdictional question, id at 524, n.16,
because it did not link its choice of law rulings to the presence
or absence of admiralty jurisdiction, as did the Third Circuit.
The conflict between the Third Circuit's approach to
choice of law questions, under which the existence of admiralty
subject matter is determinative, and that of other circuits that
look to other factors, is perhaps most starkly seen in Ghotra v.
Bandila Shipping, Inc., 113 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1997). There
the court was faced with a wrongful death claim on behalf of a
self-employed individual who was killed while inspecting a
vessel that was docked in navigable waters. In the course of
deciding which substantive law applied, the Ninth Circuit
observed both that the plaintiff has a choice of suing in federal
court in admiralty, in federal court under diversity if more than
$75,000 is at stake, or in state court, and that the same
substantive law applies, regardless of the forum or basis of
subject matter jurisdiction. Id at 1054-55. Since the plaintiff
there could have filed a negligence action at common law, the
Ghotra court held that the right to jury trial was retained, even
if he had included a claim based on in rein admiralty jurisdiction.
Id. at 1056. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the state
claim was preempted
by federal law because of the
comprehensive
liability and compensation
scheme that was
created for all seafarers, even those, like that plaintiff, whose
self-employment resulted in the denial of his claim based on
liabilitywithout fault that is available to employees. Id at 1066.

decision

Not only is the analytical divide between Ghotra and the
below evidence of the conflict among the circuits on
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the issue of the impact of subject matter jurisdiction on choice
of law, but in Ghotra the ultimate decision to apply federal law
on fiability was based on a standard preemption analysis, which
the Third Circuit never used. That was the same analysis
employed by the Eleventh Circuit in Amtrak, where the court
declined to follow state law only when it "threatened" important
substantive admiralty rights. 121 F.3d at 1426. And in Garris
v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 210 F.3d 209 (4th
Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed (U.S. Aug. 30, 2000) (No. 00346), the court upheld a negligence claim for wrongful death, as
opposed to one based on lack of seaworthiness, but only aider
determining that it was consistent with general maritime
policies. Id at 220. The decision allowed the claim to go
forward even though the plaintiff conceded that Virginia's
general wrongful death cause of action was unavailable against
that defendant under the facts of this case. ld Moreover, a
state law claim against another defendant that had been
dismissed without prejudice from the federal action in Garris
was re-filed in state court with no suggestion that the existence
of a federal claim affected the right to maintain that state law
action in any way.
The Supreme Court of Iowa recently declined to apply
broad maritime preemption principles to a state law retaliatory
discharge complaint by licensed riverboat captains who alleged
that they were fired for refiasing to violate federal safety
regulations. Clements v. Gamblers Supply Management Co.,
610 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 2000), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3229
(U.S. Oct. 2, 2000). In reaching that result, the court relied on
a pre-Yamahaopinion of the First Circuit that held that state law
claims for unlawful discharge, by a person who had been treated
successfially for alcoholism, were not preempted by federal
maritime law simply because the plaintiffworked on an oceangoing tanker, absent a direct conflict with substantive maritime
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law. Ellenwoodv. Exxon ShippingCo., 984 F.2d 1270 (lst Cir.
1993). Neither opinion was based on the presence or absence
of admiralty jurisdiction,
and both were decided by finding that
the application of state law did not work any actual interference
with maritime law, rather than, as the Third Circuit did,
assuming that all applications of state law inevitably harm
federal maritime interests.
In short, the other courts that have spoken on this issue
post-Yamaha agree that the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction in admiralty does not determine (and perhaps is not
even relevant to) the issue of whether federal or state law
applies, as the Third Circuit held, and that state law can be
utilized, if the plaintiffchooses, so long as it does not interfere
with substantive federal maritime law or policies. Accordingly,
the Court should grant review to resolve this conflict in
approaches to the choice of law issue.
C.

The Decision Below Conflicts WithPrinciples
Enunciated by This Court.

The decision below also conflicts with rulings of this
Court. As with the rulings fi'om other circuits, the conflicts with
the decisions of this Court are not on the precise choice of law
question presented by the facts of this case, but with the
principles and methods of analysis used in decisions that predate Yamaha and for which there is no suggestion in Yamaha
that the Court intended to overrule them in upholding the
Calhouns' wrongful death claim based on Pennsylvania law.
The principal error made by the court of appeals is its
almost reflexive adoption of federal law simply because this is
an admiralty case. Aside from the strong emanations in Yamaha
itself that state law did not simply provide a procedural vehicle
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to get into court, this Court on numerous occasions has made
clear that federal maritime law overrides state law only when
there is a good reason for doing so. Indeed, in this Court's most
recent case dealing with the issue of admiralty jurisdiction,
which the Third Circuit failed to mention, Grubart, Inc. v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995), the Court
found admiralty jurisdiction, and then spoke directly to the
relation between jurisdiction and choice of law: "Contrary to
what the city suggests, . . . exercise of federal admiralty
jurisdiction does not result in automatic displacement of state
law." M at 545. See also Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314,
324, 328 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that if conduct
is maritime, then forum court is irrelevant, as is basis of
jurisdiction).
Not only has this Court rejected the ldnd of mechanical
linkage adopted by the Third Circuit, but it has taken great pains
to assure that state laws are displaced only when they
significantly interfere with federal law. By contrast, for
seafarers, the Court has been reluctant to allow state law to coexist with federal law because Congress has expressly created a
comprehensive
liability scheme that deals with these issues.
That rationale was found to be irrelevant in Yamaha because
non-seafarers,
like Natalie Calhoun, are not covered by any
federal statutory plan except for deaths on the high seas, and
this accident occurred in the territorial waters of Puerto Rico.
On the issue of interference with federal law, the Third
Circuit never asked how federal policies would be subverted by
applying state law (including state choice of law rules), but
simply assumed that federal law had to apply. The decision that
seems to form the basis of the approach that maritime law
inevitably supplants state law is Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205 (1917), in which the Court declined to allow the
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application of a state worker's compensation law to a person
ofl_oading a docked vesselbecause the Court concluded that the
work was maritime in nature and within the admiralty
jurisdiction. Id at 217. But regardless of the merits of the
holding in densen, even Jensen recognized the propriety of
allowing state law to be used except where "it contravenes the
essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works
material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate
relations." let at 216. Indeed, in a recent decision of this Court
rejecting federal preemption of state rules on forum nonconveniens, American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443
(1994), densen was cited with approval as a basis for finding no
need for uniformity on that issue, id at 447, in contrast with the
need for uniform laws governing the primary conduct of a
defendant - here, the process of designing and manufacturing
the Wavqammer, not any wrongdoing that took place in Puerto
Rico. _

1Inhis opinion in AmericanDredging, concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens expressed his
view that Jensen "is just as untrustworthy a guide in an
admiralty case today as Lochner v. New York, 19g US. 45
(1905), would be in a case under the Due Process Clause." 510
U.S. at 458 (parallel citations omitted). Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting in Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 ( 1961),
observed: "Certainly no decision in the Court's history has been
the progenitor of more lasting dissatisfaction and disharmony
within a particular area of the law than" Jensen. Id. at 742-43.
The majority in American Dredging upheld the application of
state law despite Jensen, and it specifically declined to decide
(continued...)
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Since Jensen, in virtually every maritime case in which
the issue of the applicability of state law has arisen, the Court
has described the test as whether state law would interfere in
some significant way with federal maritime rights, a test that the
Third C'trcuit did not mention, let alone attempt to satisfy. Thus,
in Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941), where the tort was
unquestionably
of a maritime nature, state law was permitted to
supplement federal law "when the _,tate action is not hosf_le to
the characteristic features of the maritime law or inconsistent
with federal legislation." Id at 388. According to the Court,
uniformity "is required oily when the essential features of an
exclusive federal jurisdiction are involved," which was not the
case there since the Court found "no repugnance"
to federal law
in applying state law. ld at 392. Similarly, Justice Frankfurter
in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354 (1959), observed that the statement that all admiralty law is
federal is a "destructive oversimplification," but that "state law
must yield to the needs era uniform federal maritime law where

l(...continued)
densen's v_ldity because the issue had not briefed or argued.
510 U.S. at 447 n. 1. Justice Scalia did note, however, that it
"would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible
from impermissible state regulation is readily discernible in our
admiralty jurisprudence or indeed is even entirely consistent
within our admiralty jurisprudence." ld. at 452. The Calhouns
contend that, despite this confusion, they are entitled to prevail
even in the face of Jensen, and hence will not brief its continuing
viability in the absence of a request ffiom the Court to do so.
For an excellent discussion of the problems with densen, a plea
for overruling it, and a recommendation for an appropriate
preemption analysis in this and other similar cases, see Young,
supra.
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this Court finds inroads on a harmonious system." Id at 373.
And in Hess v. UnitedStates, 361 U.S. 314 (1960), where state
law was made applicable to a tort that was within the admiralty
jurisdi_on by the sp_ific dictates of the governing statute (the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C § 2674), the Court
recognized that in some cases federal law would override state
laws if those laws were "so offensive to traditional principles of
maritime law that the admiralty [courts] would decline to
enforce them." Id at 320. 2
Even where an insurance company issued a policy
covering a commercial vessel, in what was agreed was a
maritime central, the Court in Wdburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955), applied state law to
invalidate a condition in the contract, an issue on which
maritime law was unsettled. In so ruling, it noted that "it does
not follow, as the courts below seemed to think, that every term
in every maritime contract can only be controlled by some
federally defined admiralty rule."
Id at 313.
In his
concurrence, Justice Frankfurter took a similar view: "IT]he
demand for uniformity is not inflexibleand does not preclude the
balancing of the competing claims of state, national and
international interests .... [The admiralty law expansion] has
been a response to demands more inclusive than those for
mechanical uniformity." Id at 323-24. See also Sun Ship, lnc.

2Justice Harlan dissented, not because he believed that
maritime law must always prevail, but because he found the
application of this state law "offensive to maritime law." Id. at
323. His opinion specifically rejected the notion adopted by the
Third Circuit that the basis of subject matter jurisdiction, or
whether the case is in federal or state court, is a proper ground
for resolving these issues. Id. at 328.
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v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 726 (1980) (declining to adopt
federal rule "in the name of uniformity"). 3
There are, to be sure, modem cases displacing state law
with federal law. In two of them identified by the Court in
footnote 14 in Yamaha- Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique,358 U.S. 625 (1959), and Pope & Talbot, lnc.
v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) - federal law was a[iplied,
resulting in recoveries for the plaintiff who would have lost
under state law. Perhaps more significant than the decision as
to whether to apply federal or state law is that neither case
suggested a test other than one in which the outcome is based
on an assessment of the level of interference with maritime law
by allowing state law to operate. Although there is language in
those opinions from which one might conclude that federal
interests are generally given greater sway than those of the
states in maritime cases, it is not conclusive, and the
inconsistency with other cases discussed above forms a further
basis for review, as this Court observed in footnote 14 in
Yamaha.
The other prominent case in which federal law was
applied, Kossickv. UnitedFruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961), was
also one in which applying state law, in that case to an oral

3Ifuniformity were paramount, the proper outcome here
might be to apply the law of unseaworthiness to jet skis, even
though many jet ski accidents will not occur on navigable
waters.
The notion of applying traditional
maritime law
concepts such as unseaworthiness
to products such as jet skis,
for which the common law of products liability is already welldeveloped, is a further reason why the result below is unsound
and should be reviewed by this Court.
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promise, would have deprived the plaintiff seaman of a remedy.
The Court's finding that the contract was maritime was not
conclusive, and the Court explicitlyobserved that the process of
deciding which law to apply "is surely rather one of
accommodation, entirely familiar in many areas of overlapping
state and federal concern." Id at 739. In choosing federal law,
the Court found persuasive in this context the need for
uniformity since the promise might have been made anywhere in
the world, id. at 741, but never suggested that federal law is
always applicable in maritime cases on that basis alone. 4
In addition to the cases in footnote 14, there are also the
forceful dissents in Hess and in Foremost Ins. Co. v.

4Both Kossick and Kermarec were diversity cases, which
confirms that subject matter jurisdiction is not, as the Third
Circuit thought, dispositive of choice of law. By the same
token, in The Tungusv. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959), where
state law was utilized, the case was in the federal court on
admiraltyjurisdiction, which could not have happened under the
Third Circuit's theory. But see East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 & n.2 (1986)
(observing that, although plaintiff did not seek to apply state
law, "[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of
substantive admiralty law"). Footnote 14 suggests that the
difference in use of substantive federal and state law may result
from the fact that some of the cases involve wrongful deaths, for
which there was no federal remedy for non-seafarers until
recently, and others were claims for personal injuries, for which
that problem did not exist. In our view, that line is not an
appropriate one for deciding whether federal or state law
applies, but in any event, it is not the basis on which the court of
appeals reached its decision .in this case.
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Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982), that suggest a wide berth for
federal law in these kinds of situations. In Hess, Justice Harlan,
joined by Justice Frankfurter, dissented because the majority had
not found "the federal interest in regulating the conduct of the
dam owner [on whose property the deced_t was working] is so
minimal - whether by reason of the fixed situs of the dam or on
some other ground - that the federal supremacy principle may
reasonably be found inapplicable," 361 U.S. at 338, a standard
that can be read to be less favorable to state law claims than that
set forth in other decisions. In Foremost, the issue before the
Court was whether there was federal admiralty jurisdiction over
claims arising fiom a collision of two pleasure boats where there
was no diversity between the parties. In disagreeing with the
Court's finding of a connection to maritime matters, Justice
Powell, also writing for Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor, observed: "The Court's opinion
largely ignores the fact that expansions of federal admiralty
jurisdiction are accompanied by application of substantive - and
pre-empting - federal admiralty law." 457 U.S. at 685 (citing
Jensen and Kossick). Again, although we believe that the
decisions discussed above are more persuasive, the existence of
arguably contradictory
authority, even in dissents, is further
evidence of the need for this Court's review of the question
presented.

A final word on what granting the petition can and
cannot do to help clarify the law. As we have argued above, the
issue in this case, where the Calhouns have based their claim on
state law, is not principally one of choice of law, but of
preemption,
since the faderal-state issues would be the same if
the accident had occurred on the Delaware River as it passes
through Philadelphia.
The principal error of the Third Circuit
was its conclusion that subject matter jurisdiction was the key
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to deciding which laws apply in cases like this, and a decision of
this Court can make clear that the Third Circuit's approach and
its result are in error. The Court can also make clear that a
plaintiffmay choose which set of laws will form the basis of his
or her complaint, on issues of liability and of damages, but that,
like any other case, under this Court's preemption doctrine,
state laws may have to give way to federal law in certain
circumstances. The Court could, but need not in our view in
this case, address the issue of whether preemption should be
applied differently in maritime cases (other than those in which
there is an applicable federal statute). But even if it chooses to
speak to that issue, there will still remain areas of uncertainty as
there inevitablywill be whenever preemption is the issue. At the
very least, a decision by this Court can set the lower courts on
the right course and steer them away from the shoals on which
the Third Circuit has foundered.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.
Respect_lly
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OPINION OF THE COURT
GARTH, Circuit Judge:
Admiralty law is considered one of the most complex
areas of American law. See 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
Admiralty &Maritime Law, § 1-1, at 2 (2d ed. 1994). In an
earlier appeal in this matter, the United States Supreme Court
held that Lucien and Robin Calhoun ("the Calhouns") may assert
a cause of action based upon a state wrongful death or survival
statute to obtain relief for the death of a non-seaman killed in
United States territorial waters. See Yamaha Motor Corp.,
US.A.v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, (1996). We are now asked to
resolve some of the problems arising from the Supreme Court's
holding - problems that the Court itself recognized -- by ruling
upon two distinct questions that the Court expressly declined to
decide.
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In particular, we must determine (1) which state's law
governs the type of damages available, and (2) whether state or
federal law governs the standards by which the liability of
appellees Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. and Yamaha
Motor Company, Ltd. will be defined. As a result, this appeal
concerns the extent to which state law may co-exist in the
admiralty arena that historically has been the exclusive domain
of federal legislative and regulatory entities. See generally David
R. Lapp, Note, At_,niralty&Federalism in the Wake of Yamaha
Motor Corp. U.S.A.v. Calhoun: Is Yamaha a Cry by the
Judiciary for Legislative Action in State Territorial Waters?, 41
Win.&Mary L. Rev. 677 (2000).
With regard to damages, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the law of
Pennsylvania would govern the issue of compensatory
damages
and that the law &Puerto Rico would govern that of punitive
damages. The District Court further held that the law of Puerto
Rico would govern the issue of Yamaha's liability. We will
affirm in part and reverse in part, affirming the District Court's
holding with respect to damages (both compensatory and
punitive), yet reversing the District Court's disposition
concerning liability, holding instead that federal maritime law
must govern the standards by which Yamaha's liability will be
evaluated.

In July 1989, Natalie Calhoun ("Natalie"), then twelve
years old, traveled to Puerto Rico with her parents' permission
to vacation with a friend and that friend's family. Tragically,
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however, on July 6, 1989, Natalie died when the Yamaha 1
"WaveJammer "2 she was operating in the water bordering the
resort at which she was staying struck an anchored vessel. The
Calhouns, as Pennsylvania residents, filed the present action
against Yamaha on June 27, 1990, sacldng relief pursuant to the
Pennsylvania wrongful death and survival statutes, 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. §§ 8301-8302 (West 1995). The Calhouns'
complaint, which alleged defects in the WaveJammer, is
grounded in theories &strict liability, negligence, and breach of
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose. The complaint seeks both compensatory and punitive
damages. Because the law of Puerto Rico does not allow a
plainfiffto recover punitive damages, the Calhouns asserted that
all questions concerning the appropriate form of remedy be
governed by the law of Pennsylvania. For the same reason, on
the other hand, Yamaha argued for the application of the law of
Puerto Rico for resolution of all damages issues.

_We will refer to both Yamaha entities that are the
subject of this action collectively as "Yamaha." Yamaha Motor
Company, Ltd. is the manufacturing arm of the corporation, and
is both incorporated
and has its principal place of business in
Japan. Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A., is the distributing
arm of the corporation, and is both incorporated and has its
principal place of business in California.
2Although Yamaha apparently no longer manufactures
the "WaveJammer,"
both this Court and the Supreme Court
previously have described the vehicle as a class of jet ski. See
YamahaMotor Corp., U.S.A.v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202
(1996); Calhcmnv. YahcmtaMotor Corp., U.S.A., 40 F.3d 622,
624 (3d Cir. 1994). At oral argument, counsel for the Calhouns
referred to the WaveJammer as a "watertoy."
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Yamaha filed a motion for partial summary judgment on
November 27, 1991, alleging that because Natalie died in United
States territorial waters, 3 federal maritime law provided the
Calhouns'
sole remedy for the circumstances
surrounding
Natalie's death. 4 The District Court granted Yamaha's motion
in part, and dismissed that portion of the Calhouns' complaint
that sought punitive damages and the loss of ffiature earnings.
See Calhoun v. YamahaMotor Corp.,U.S.A., No. CIV. A. 904295, 1.993 WL 216238, at "12 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 1993). After
the Calhouns took an interlocutory
appeal, we affirmed in part
and reversed in part. See Calhoun v. Yahama Motor Corp.,
U.S.A., 40 F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 1994). We concluded that although
the Supreme Court, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, lnc.,
398 U.S. 375 (1970), had eliminated the use of state law causes
of action for deaths of seamen in territorial waters, state causes
of action still remained available as relief for the death of non-

3Theterm "territorial waters" refers to "all inland waters,
all waters between line of mean high tide and line of ordinary
law water, and all waters seaward to a line three geographical
miles distant fi'om the coast line." Black's Law Dictionary 1473
(6th ed. 1990); see also Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 624 (quoting
William C. Brown, III, Problems Arising from the Intersection
of TraditionalMaritime Law and Aviation Death and Personal
Injury Liability, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 577, 581 (1994)). The parties
do not dispute that Natalie's death occurred in the territorial
waters surrounding the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico.
'As we discuss infra, the Calhouns opposed the
application of federal maritime law to the substantive liability
issues presented in the litigation because as opposed to the law
of Pennsylvania, federal maritime law would allow Yamaha to
introduce evidence of Natalie's negligence. See infra n. 16
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seamen in territorial waters. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, see Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A.v. Calhoun, 514
U.S. 1126 (1995), and affirmed in an unanimous opinion. See
YamahaMotor Corp., U.S.A.v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
Neither the original panel of this Court nor the Supreme
Court, however, answered the questions that emerged from their
respective holdings. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 216 n.14;
Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 6-!'1.45. First, if the Calhouns could utilize
Pennsylvania's wrongful death or survival statute to obtain relief
for Natalie's death, which law5- Pennsylvania's or Puerto Rico's
-- governs the form of the remedy (or remedies) available to the
Calhouns? Second, even understanding that Pennsylvania's
wrongful death or survival statute provides the vehicle through
which this action may proceed, does federal maritime law or
state law provide the standards by which Yamaha's substantive
liabilitywill be determined? If the answer to this latter question
is state law, will such liability standards be derived from the law
of Pennsylvania or Puerto Rico?
On remand from the Supreme Court, the District Court
issued a preliminary ruling on the first of these questions during
a hearing held on September 23, 1998, a ruling that the District
Court ffirmliTJed
in an opinion and order filed on March 22, 1999.
See Calhoun v. YamahaMotor Corp., U.S.A., 40 F. Supp. 2d
288 (E.D. Pa. 1999). Specifically, the District Court held that
because the present action "sounds in admiralty," federal choice-

_Although Puerto Rico is technically classified as a
"commonwealth" and not a "state," we, as did the District
Court, will use the term "state law" to describe the law of both
Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico.
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of-law rules 6 would be employed to determine whether
Pennsylvania or Puerto Rico's law on damages would govern the
present action. Invoking the doctrine of depecage, 7the District
Court held that Pennsylvania law would govern the Calhouns'
claim for compensatory damages and the law of Puerto Rico
would govern their claim for punitive damages. Insofar as the
law of Puerto Rico did not provide for the recovery of punitive
danmges, the District Court granted partial summary judgment
in flavorof Yamaha and dismissed that portion of the Calhouns'
complaint that sought punitive damages. As for the second
issue, the District Court determined that state law would govern
the standards of liability, and, more specifically, that the law of
Puerto Rico would be the source of such standards.
The District Court again certified these issues to tiffs
Court through an interlocutory order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292_o). On April 12, 1999, we permitted the Calhouns to take
tiffs appeal.

The District Court's order requires us to address and
answer three different questions:

6As we discuss in detail infra, federal choice-of-law
analysis in the admiralty arena is governed by the Supreme
Court's opinion in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US. (1953). See
infra Part III-B.
_"Depecage" refers to the use of the law of different
states to resolve different issues in the same case. See, e.g., Rutz
v. Blentech Corp., 89 F.3d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1996).
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1. Did [the District Court] err in deciding, on remand, that
partial summary judgment should be granted to Yamaha,
precluding any claimby the Calhouns for punitive damages,
on the ground that (a) the availability of punitive damages
should be determined by the remedial law of Puerto Rico,
the situs of the tragic accident giving rise to the suit, and Co)
the law of remedies of Puerto Rico makes no provision for
punitive damages?
2. Did [the District Court] err in deciding, on remand, that
the Calhouns' entitlement to seek particular categories of
compensatory damages should be determined by the law of
remedies of Pennsylvania, the state of residence of Lucien
and Robin Calhoun and of their daughter Natalie, rather than
by the law of remedies of Puerto Rico, the situs of Natalie's
fatal accident, and hence that Yamaha's motion for partial
summary judgment should be denied insofar as it sought to
preclude the Calhouns from seeking compensatory damages
in conformity with the law of remedies of Pennsylvania7
3. Did [the District Court] err in deciding, on remand, that
the jurisdiction whose substantive liability law is the source
of the Calhouns' claims is Puerto Rico?
Calhoun, 40 F. Supp.2d at 295-96.

We turn first to the questions concerning damages. In
issuing its ruling, the District Court reached three separate
conclusions: (1) because the action instituted by the Calhouns
concerned a death occurring in the "navigable waters" of the
United States, the action "sounded in admiralty," and therefore
implicated federal choice-of-law rules; (2) given the differing
(yet significant) interests of both Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico
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in the proper mode of recovery in this matter, the use of the
depecage
doctrine
was appropriate;
and (3) because
Pennsylvania has a stronger interest in providing compensation
for its citizens, Pennsylvania's
law would govern as to
compensatory
damages, and because Puerto Rico has a stronger
interest in punishing Yamaha for tortious acts occurring in its
territorial waters, Puerto Rico's law would govern on punitive
damages. The significance of the District Court's punitive
damage ruling is that the law of Puerto Rico does not allow for
the recovery of punitive damages in a wrongful death or survival
action. 8
A
We must first address a threshold question: do federal
choice-of-law
rules govern the Calhouns' damage claims7 The
appropriate choice-of-law rules to be applied is controlled by the
basis for our federal jurisdiction, or power to adjudicate the
Calhouns' claims_ See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). It is axiomatic that a
federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law
rules of the state in which it sits. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941); see also

8The District Court's interlocutory
order also inquires if
it erred with respect to its more substantive holding that law of
Puerto Rico would not provide the Calhouns with the
opportunity for punitive damages on the facts presented in their
complaint. We hold that the District Court did not err, and
therefore answer this portion of the interlocutory
order in the
negative. See, e.g., Barreto v. Citibank, N.A., 907 F.2d 15, 15
(lst Cir. 1990); Shelley v. Trafalgar House Public Ltd., 977 F.
Supp. 95, 96 & n.1 (D.PR. 1997); In re San Juan Dupont
PlazaHotelFire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79, 84 (D.P.R. 1990).
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Assicurazioni General, S.P.A. v. Clover, 195 F.3d 161,164 (3d
Cir. 1999). As such, if our jurisdiction were to be based upon
diversity principles, the District Court would be bound to apply
Pennsylvania
choice-of-law
rules insofar as the Calhouns
instituted their action against Yamaha in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. If, however, our jurisdiction were to be grounded
in admiralty, federal choice-of-law
principles, first identified in
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), would apply. See,
e.g., AquaMarine Constructors, Inc. v. Banks, 110 F.3d 663,
670 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nora, Polaris Ins. Co. v. AquaMawineConstructors, lnc., 522 U.S. 933 (1997); Complaint of
Kreta Shtpping, S.A.,1 F. Supp. 2d 282, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1998); AGIP Petroleum Co. v. Gulf Island Fabrication, Inc.,
920 F. Supp. 1318, 1323 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
The Calhouns initially averred that the District Court
properly could exercise subject matter jurisdiction over their
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333, which provides the federal
courts with jurisdiction over "any civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C §
1333(1). 9 See Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 626 n.5. In an attempt to

qn this initial appeal, the panel determined that the
District Court could have exercised subject matter jurisdiction
over the Calhouns' action pursuant to the admiralty provision of
section 1333. The Supreme Court issued a similar statement in
its opinion. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 206. Insofar as this
determination
was not necessary to either court's ultimate
holding, however, it properly is classified as dictum. It therefore
does not possess a binding effect on us pursuant to the "law of
the case" doctrine. See, e.g., In re Cityof Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d
711,717 (3d Cir. 1998); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola
Co., 988 F.2d 414, 429 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Arizona v.
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ensure the use of Pennsylvania's wrongful death and survival
statutes, however, the Calhouns quickly withdrew from this
position. Indeed, given the fact that the accident giving rise to
this action involved the operation of a recreational -- as opposed
to a commercial -- water vehicle, see Ex Parte Easton, 95 U.S.
68, 72-73, 24 L. Ed. 373 (1877), an application of admiralty
jurisdiction would appear - at first blush -- misplaced here. The
Supreme Court's previous holding, authorizing the Calhouns'
use of a state law remedy to obtain damages as relief for
Natalie's death, see Calhoun, 516 U.S. at 216, further suggests
that the present matter fallsoutside of our admiralty jurisdiction.
Before 1972, the Supreme Court adhered to what was
known as the "locality test," which authorized the exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction in all matters in which the incident giving
rise to the cause of action occurred on the navigable waters of
the United States. See, e.g., Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404
U.S. 202, 205 n.2 (1971); The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20,
35 (1865). In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,
409 U.S. 249 (1972), however, the Court abandoned the use of
the locality test in a case concerning an airplane that crashed
into Lake Erie shortly after takeoff See id. at 250, 261. The
Court replaced the locality test with an analysis that required a
court to determine whether the incident in question bore a
"significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Id at
268. Holding that an airplane crash did not bear such a
relationship to traditional maritime activity, the Court held that
the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction was not appropriate.
See
id.
The Court further explained the Executive Jet standard in
Richardson v. Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. 668 (1982). In

California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)).
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Richardson, two boats that were being used for recreational
purposes -- but had never been utilized for commercial purposes
-- had collided on the Amite River in Louisiana. See id. at 669.
Notwithstanding the lack of any nexus to commercial activity,
and citing the need for uniform rules of conduct and the fact that
a pleasure boat collision could potentially impact maritime
commerce, the Court held that "the negligent operation of a
vessel on navigable waters ... had a sufficient nexus to
traditional maritime activity to sustain admiralty jurisdiction." Id.
at 674-75) o In so holding, the Court stated that the incident
giving rise to the claim in question must have some impact on
maritime commerce to support admiralty jurisdiction, but that
the collision of two pleasure boats satisfied such a requirement.
See id. at 675.
The Court reemphasized these principles in Sisson v.
Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990), where the Court held that admiralty
jurisdiction was available to adjudicate a cause of action
concerning a fire that started on board a pleasure yacht, and
proceeded to damage several other boats as well as the marina
at which the owner docked the yacht. See id. at 360. Indeed, the

1°Althoughit announced a rule that appeared to sanction
the expanded use of admiralty jurisdiction, the Court cautioned
that "not every accident in navigable waters that might disrupt
maritime commerce will support admiralty jurisdiction." ld. at
675 n.5. In this vein, the Court cited its opinion in Executive Jet,
arguing that although an airplane crash in navigable waters
might interfere with maritime commerce, such an accident did
not possess the requisite connection to traditional maritime
activity. See id. We, however, have recently suggested that
admiralty jurisdiction would extend even to a simple slip and fall
that occurred on a cruise line. See Fedorczyk v. Caribbean
Cruise Lines, Lid, 82 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1996).
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Court held that "the need for uniform rules of maritime conduct
and liability is not limited to navigation, but extends at least to
any other activities traditionally
undertaken
by vessels,
commercial or noncommercial." Id. at 367 (emphasis added).
Turning to the present appeal, the Yamaha WaveJammer
that Natalie was operating at the time of her death is a type of
pleasure craft that is almost exclusively used for recreational
purposes. Nevertheless, the Court's recent jurisprudence -namely, Richardson and Sisson -- indicates that so long as the
incident in question, and the vehicles utilized therein, bears some
relation to traditional maritime activity and could, in any way,
impact upon the flow of maritime commerce, admiralty
jurisdiction is proper. See generally 1 U.S.C. § 3 ("The word
'vessel' includes every description of watercraft or other artificial
contrivance use, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on water." (emphasis added)).
Further, much like the collision at issue in Richardson,
the collision between the two vessels in the instant matter bears
some impact, however remote, on maritime commerce. In
particular, the vessel that Natalie struck could have been a
commercial boat, or the ensuing investigation into the crash
could have made commercial navigation in and around the
marina difficult. 11 Indeed, the accident at issue here is virtually

nThe Court has continuously directed that in examining
an incident's nexus to maritime commerce for the purposes of
admiralty jurisdiction, a court must look not only to the specific
impact that the particular incident had on such commerce, but
to "the potential impact of [the] incident by examining its
general character." Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363. For instance, the
Richardson Court determined that although the collision of
those particular pleasure boats in the Amite River did not
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identical to the accident that occurred in Richardson, and as
such, we hold that we properly exercise jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to the admiralty provisions of 28 U.S.C §
1333(1). We are therefore satisfied that the District Court was
correct in applying federal choice-of-law principles in
determining which law on damages should be applied to this
case. 12

threaten maritime commerce, if the same collision were to have
occurred in the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, the impact on
maritime commerce would have been serious. See Richardson,
457 U.S. at 675. This latter conclusion, the Court held, provided
the District Court with admiralty jurisdiction. See id.
12We also hold that the District Court did not err in
employing the doctrine known as "depecage." The Calhouns
strongly argue against the application of this doctrine, offering
as support our opinion in Broome v. Antlers' Hunting Club, 595
F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1979). In Broome, sitting in diversity, we
predicted that although the Pennsylvania
courts had yet to issue
a definitive opinion either approving or disfavoring the use of
depecage, the Pennsylvania courts would likely approve the use
of the doctrine. See id. at 923-24. Nevertheless, as we are
obliged to apply federal choice-of-law
principles, Broome is
inapposite. We note that a number of district courts within this
circuit have utilized depecage, see, e.g., City of Rome v.
Glanton, 958 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Chemetron
Investments
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 886 F. Supp. 1194,
1199 (WD. Pa. 1994), and that the doctrine has obtained
support in our sister circuits. See, e.g., Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton
Corp., 174 F3d 842, 848 (7th Cir. 1999); Johnson v.
Continental Airlines Corp., 964 F.2d 1059, 1062 (10th Cir.
1992).
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Federal choice-of-law rules in the admiralty arena are
governed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Lanritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 97 L. Ed. 1254, 73 S. Ct. 921 (1964). In
Launtzen, the Court held that
Maritime law, like our municipal law, has attempted to
avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by
ascertaining and valuing points of conflict between contact
between the transaction
and the states or government
between the transaction regulated and the states or
governments
whose competing
laws are involved. The
criteria, in general, appear to be arrived at from weighing of
the significance of one or more connecting factors between
the shipping transaction regulated and the national interest
served by the assertion of authority.
Id. at 582.
The Court identified seven factors for courts to weigh in
rendering choice-of-law decisions; place of the wrongful act,
law of the flag, allegiance or domicile of the injured, allegiance
of the defendant shipowner, place of contract, inaccessibility of
a foreign forum, and the law of the forum. See id. at 583-91.
Many of these factors (e.g., law of the flag, allegiance of the
defendant shipowner, and inaccessibility
of a foreign forum),
however, do not apply to the present dispute, which concerns
entirely domestic interests.
Lauritzenitself involved a choice between the law of the
United States and that of Denmark, see id. at 573-74, and,
indeed, the Lauritzen factors are most otten applied to
determine whether the admiralty law of the United States or that
of a foreign state should be applied to a particular dispute. See,
e.g., Carbotrade S.p.A. v. Bureau Veritas, 99 F.3d 86, 89 (2d

[
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Ck. 1996); Zacaria v. Gulf King 35, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 560,
563 (S.D. Tex. 1999). The Lauritzen Court recognized this
focus on international disputes. See Zacaria, 31 F. Supp. 2d at
563 ("Generally, the law of the flag and the defendant
shipownefs base of operations weigh most heavily in the
determination." (citing Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583)).
Nevertheless, we had the opportunity to apply the
Lauritzen analysis to a purely domestic tort action in Scott v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968). In Scott, an
airplane bound for Atlanta -- with a layover in Philadelphia -took off from Logan Airport in Boston only to crash into
Boston Harbor shortly thereafter.
See id. at 18-19. The
survivors of one of the passengers on board that flight sued the
airline in both tort and contract, and we determined, with
respect to the tort issues, that the Lauritzen factors would
govern whether Massachusetts or Pennsylvania law would
apply. See id. at 25. We determined that the Lauritzen factors,
viewed as a whole, represented a departure from the application
-- in admiralty cases -- of the lex loci delecti 13rule and a move
toward
analyzing which state had the most significant
relationship to the incident and the dominant interest in having
its law applied. 14See id. at 28-29.

13The lex loci delecti doctrine requires courts to apply
the law of the state in which the tort occurred. See Griffith v.
United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1,203 A.2d 796, 805 (Pa. 1964).
1'The "most significant relationship" analysis is that
which has been advocated by the American Law Institute's
Second Restatement on Conflicts of Law. See Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Law § 145 (1971). As we explained in
Scott, the Restatement itself had cited Lauritzen as an example
of the "most significant relationship" standard. See Scott, 399
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We held that because the crash that occurred in Boston
Harbor was purely fortuitous or adventitious, Massachusetts
had
a very limited relationship to the accident that gave rise to the
cause of action and therefore had little interest in having its law
applied. See id at 28. On the other hand, because Pennsylvania
was the decedent's domicile, the situs of his ticket purchase, and
the administration
of his estate, Pennsylvania had the most
significant relationship to the action, as well as the dominant
interest in having its law applied. See id.
The Calhouns argue that because Natalie did not intend
for the WaveJammer she was operating to lose control, the fact
that she was killed in Puerto Rico was just as fortuitous as the
incident that occurred in Scott, and that therefore Puerto Rico
has little, if any, relationship to the accident and little interest in
having its law applied. We disagree. If we were to accept the
Calhouns' interpretation of the Scott court's concept of fortuity,
virtually every accidental injury would qualify as "fortuitous,"
thus diluting to the point of extinction any application of the law
of the state in which an injury or death occurred.
Although we
agree that the Supreme Court has expressed a dislike for a rote
application of the lex loci delecti doctrine, we believe that the
Court intended a rule that balanced, rather than displaced, the
various states' interests.
The airplane in Scott could have crashed anywhere -Boston Harbor, the Hudson River, or Long Island Sound -- it

F.2d at 28 n.9 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
§ 145 Reporter's Note at 20 (Proposed Official Draft, Part II,
1971)). The Second Restatement includes, as a relevant part of
this analysis, an inquiry into which state has the dominant
interest in having its law applied. See Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts of Law § 145 cmt. b.
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was merely chance that the plane went down in the territorial
waters off the coast of Massachusetts, as opposed to, for
instance, New York or New Jersey. Here, however, Natalie
mtengonally traveled to Puerto Rico and intentionally operated
the WaveJammer in Puerto Rico's territorial waters. This being
so, there was no possibility that Natalie's accident could have
occurred anywhere other than in Puerto Rico.
Courts within this Circuit have held that the concept of
"fortuitous injury" cannot be invoked in an effort to avoid
application of the law of state in which the injury occurred when
the injured (or deceased) intentionally traveled to the location of
the accident. See, e.g., Tonkon v. Denny's, Inc., 650 F. Supp.
119, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("When a party voluntarily and
intentionally travels to another state, the location of an injury
incurred there is not fortuitous." (citing Blakesley v. Wolford,
789 F.2d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1986)). We have held that once a
court classifies an activity or accident as non-fortuitous in
nature," 'the place of the injury assumes much more importance,
and in some instances may be determinative.' "LeJeune v. BlissSalem, Inc., 85 F.3d 1069, 1072 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Shuder
v. McDonald's Corp., 859 F.2d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 1988));
Shields v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 810 F.2d 397, 401 (3d Cir.
1987)).
Here, as we have related, Natalie voluntarily traveled to
Puerto Rico and boarded, as well as operated, the WaveJammer
that ultimately caused her death. The sole relationship that
Pennsylvania enjoys with this incident is that the Calhouns -- and
Natalie prior to her death -- were Pennsylvania domiciliaries, as
well as the fact that Natalie's estate will be administered in
Pennsylvania. Although these ties are certainly relevant, they do
not outweigh the more prominent relationship that Puerto Rico,
as the situs of the injury, has with this litigation. These principles
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therefore counsel in favor of the application of the law of Puerto
Rico on the issue of both compensatory and punitive damages.
As stated above, however, we must also inquire into
which state has the most dominant interest in having its law
applied to this litigation. Viewed in this manner, and through the
lens of the depecage doctrine, both Pennsylvania and Puerto
Rico each have significant interests in having its respective law
applied to the different types of damages that the Calhouns seek
through their complaint.
The purpose of compensatory damages is "to make the
plaintiff whole." Feingold v. SEPTA, 512 Pa. 567, 517 A.2d.
1270, 1276 (Pa. 1986); see also Saldana Sanchez v. Vega Sosa,
175 F.3d 35, 36 (lst Cir. 1999). Given that the individuals who
seek to be made whole - the Calhouns and Natalie's estate -are all Pennsylvania domiciliaries, it appears as if Pennsylvania
has a strong interest in having its law of compensatory damages
apply to the present matter. Further, it is hard to dispute that
Pennsylvania has a substantial interest in obtaining compensation
for its citizens in order to remedy wrongs that have been
committed against such individuals. See, e.g., Blakesley, 789
F.2d at 242 n.11. That interest, however, does not obtain insofar
as Puerto Rico is concerned, as the Calhouns have virtually no
connection to Puerto Rico. Accordingly, Puerto Rico would
have very little interest in either making the Calhouns whole or
remedying wrongs that Yamaha may have committed against
them.
Punitive damages, on the other hand, are intended to
punish wrongdoers and deter future conduct. See, e.g.,
Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 521 Pa. 97, 555 A.2d
800, 803 (Pa. 1989); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive
Damages (withNotes on Cognitionand Valuation in Law), 107
Yale L.J. 2071, 2081 (1999) (quoting a jury instruction
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regarding punitive damages as stating "the purpose of such an
award is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter that wrongdoer
from repeating such wrongfill acts"). Although Pennsylvania has
an interest in punishing those who harm their citizens, we are
persuaded that Puerto Rico's interest in regulating the activity
that occurs in its territorial waters-- whether commercial or
recreational -- is more dominant. Indeed, the tragic death that
befell Natalie easily could have been visited upon a Puerto Rican
citizen. Cf. Puerto Rico Act No. 48 (1986) ("The State ... must
be watchful for the owners of vessels, sailors, and water skiers
to also be prudent in their enjoyment and practice of their
recreational activities, for their benefit and that of the bathers.").
Puerto Rico also has an especially strong interest in maintaining
the safety of the waterways surrounding the island to preserve
the economic benefits it derives from both tourism and other
commercial enterprises. :s
As a result, we hold that the District Court did not err in
ruling that it would apply the law of Pennsylvania in the
determination of compensatory damages and the law of Puerto
Rico in the determination of punitive damages.

1'The Calhouns argue that Puerto Rico cannot have a
dominant interest in the application of its law on punitive
damages because Puerto Rico has rejected the use of punitive
damages as a deterrent measure. Such an argument, however,
miscomprehends the nature of our inquiry. The appropriate
question is not whether Puerto Rico's specific interest in the
application
of its law on punitive damages is dominant as
compared to Pennsylvania's, but rather, whether the state in
which the injury occurred has a dominant interest in the
application of its law on punitive damages as compared to the
state of the plaintiff's domicile.
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The District Court also ruled that state law -sp_ifieally, the law of Puerto Rico -- would be applied in order
to determine whether Yamaha was substantively liable for
Natalie's death. As earlier noted, the District Court's
interlocutory order asked us to answer the following:
3. Did [the District Court] err in deciding, on remand, that
the jurisdiction whose substantive liability law is the source
of the Calhouns' claims is Puerto Rico?
Calhoun, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 298.1_ We hold that the answer
given by the District Court, that the law of Puerto Rico would

16Thisissue is more than a merely academic exercise. As
counsel for the Calhouns indicated at oral argument,
Pennsylvania
law would bar any attempt by Yamaha, under a
comparative negligence theory, to introduce evidence of
Natalie's negligence in operating the WaveJammer in order to
limit its own liability. See Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co.,
734 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) ("The general rule [is] that
contributory and comparative negligence are not defenses to a
strict products liability action. "), appeal denied, 751 A.2d 191,
2000 WL 60053 (Pa. 2000); Jara v. Rexworks, Inc., 718 A.2d
788, 793 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). On the other hand, a plaintiff's
comparative negligence is a proper defense to a cause of action
sounding in admiralty. See United States v. Reliable Transfer
Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411, (1975) ("We hold that when two or
more parties have contributed by their fault to cause property
damage.., damages [are] to be allocated equally only when the
parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to
measure the comparative degr6e of their fault."); see also Farr
v. NCMach. Co., 186 F.3d 1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 1999); In re:
Sincere Navigation Corp., 529 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1976).

I
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govern, was erroneous. Our holding to this effect obliges us to
reverse that part of the District Court's order.
The answer to the District Court's question revolves
around the proper interpretation of a number of Supreme Court
opinions concluding with the Court's opinion in the instant
matter. Prior to 1970, actions for wrongful death in admiralty
were governed by the Supreme Court's decision, during the
Court's 1886 term, in TheHarrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, (1886). In
TheHcerrisburg,the Court held that because Congress had not
seen fit to provide a cause of action for wrongfill death in
admiralty cases, it wonid be inappropriate for the federal courts
to create such a cause of action from federal common law. See
id at 213. In so ruling, the Court stated that "the fights of
persons in this particular [action] under the maritime law of this
country are not different from those under the common law, and
[ ] it is the duty of courts to declare the law, not to make it." Id.
at 213-14. The Court's holding in The Harrisburg therefore
forced plaintiffs such as the Calhouns to rely exclusively upon
state causes of action if they sought to obtain a remedy for an
allegedly wrongful death in United States territorial waters.
After The Harrisburg, a trilogy of Supreme Court
opinions decided between 1959 and 1960 informed lower courts
that when exercising their admiralty jurisdiction, they were
required to apply state law completely -- with respect to both
procedural and substantive issues. See Goett r. Union Carbide
Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960); Hess r. United States, 361 U.S.
314 (1960); The Tungus ¢. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
Representative of this trilogy was The Tungus v. Skovgaard,
358 U.S. 588 (1959), in which the Court held that
decisions of this Court long ago established that when
admiralty adopts a State's right of action for wrongful death,
it must enforce the right as an integrated whole, with
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whatever conditions and limitations the creating State has
attached.
Id. at 592. Importantly, the Court in The Tungus expressly
based this language upon its holding in TheHc_risburg. See id
Because no federal statute provided a cause of action for
wrongful death in territorial waters, The Harrisburg and The
Tungussuggested that courts entertaining such causes of action
were to apply state law liability standards. Indeed, the Court
explicitly held in Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960),
that "in an action for wrongful death in state territorial waters,
the conduct said to give rise to liability is to be measured not
under admiral,s standards of action, hut under the substantive
standards &the state law." M at 319.
This principle, through which the states remained a
virtually equal participant in regulating the means by which an
individual could obtain relief for another's death on the water,
seenfingly changed as a result of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Moragne v. UnitedMarine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). In
Moragne, the Court overruled The Harrisburg and created a
federal cause of action under the federal common law for
wrongful death to provide a remedy for survivors of seamen
killed in territorial waters. See id at 409. Indeed, The Moragne
Court stated that the rule adopted in The Harrisburg "had little
justification except in primitive English legal history -- a history
far removed from the American law of remedies for maritime
deaths." ld. at 379.
The Moragne Court did not, however, expressly
overrule the trilogy of The Tungus,Hess, and Goett. Rather, the
Court stated that the genesis of the jurisprudential nightmare
that resulted in the Court's holding in Moragne could be found
in The Harrisburg, not The Tungus. See id. at 378 ("We have
concluded that the primary source of the confusion is not to be
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found in The Tungus,but in TheHarrisburg...."). Although the
Court declined to overrule The Tungus expressly, we could
argue, were it not for subsequent expressions of our Court and
the Supreme Court itself, that with the demise of The
Hornsburg, the Court similarly relegated, sub silentio, opinions
such as The Tungus,Hess, and Goett to the jurisprudential scrap
heap of history, insofar as such rulings were expressly based
upon The Harrisburg. As the District Court recognized, this
was also the position taken by most admiralty commentators
prior to the institution of this litigation. See, e.g., 2 Richard
Ziade, Benedict on Admiralty, § 81e, at 7-17 n. 59 (7th ed.
1999); Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of
Admiralty, § 6-32, at 367 (2d ed. 1975).
The earlier opinions of both our Court and the Supreme
Court in the Calhoun/Yamaha controversy to which we have
previously referred, however, appear to imply otherwise.
Indeed, in our previous Calhoun opinion, we observed that the
portion of The Tungus that suggested that the ability of a nonseaman to obtain relief for injury or death occurring in state
territorial waters depended on state statutory law "retained
vitality post-Moragne." Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 641 n.39. The
Supreme Court echoed our reasoning. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at
212. The question therefore becomes whether these statements
have revived the principle for which The Tungus has become
most known -- a court heating an action in which a party is
using a state wrongful death statute to institute an action in
admiralty must apply state law to all issues presented. The
District Court answered this question in the affirmative,
reasoning that "in this Circuit, The Tungus, with all its
Harrisburg-era warts, remains good law with respect to the
proposition
that 'fights of non-seaman
[sic] killed in state
territorial waters depend on [**35]
state wrongful death
statute.'" Calhoun, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 295. From this principle,
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the District Court extrapolated that "the substantive rights of
those suing derivatively from, or in the name of, nonseafarers
killed in the territorial waters of a state have their source in state
law." Id
We respectfully disagree. We believe that The Tungus
remains good law only with respect to its broader proposition
concerning
the role that state regulation may play in the
admiralty arena. The Supreme Court has lent credence to this
broader proposition
by authorizing the Calhouns' use of
Pennsylvania's wrongful death/survival statute only as the
vehicle through which they may prosecute their action. The
more specific holding of The Tungus, however -- that federal
courts must apply all facets of state law when a plaintiff seeks to
proceed by way of a cause of action grounded in state law -was effectively overruled in Moragne once the Court invalidated
the reasoning advanced by the Court in The Harrisburg. The
Tungus's emphasis on the usage of the particulars of state law
was specifically trained on the fact that federal law (both
statutory and common law) did not provide a cause of action for
wrongful death on the water. This was the very precept that was
universally struck down in Moragne, through which the
Supreme Court created such a cause of action. As such, The
Tungus's remaining vitality rests only upon the limited
proposition announced by the Supreme Court earlier in this very
litigation -- that state law may provide a procedure or a vehicle
through which a plaintiffmay institute an action to remedy death
in territorial waters.
The District Court's holding also failed to take account
of the prevailing policy that has guided the advancement
of
federal admiralty law and regulation: uniformity. Creating a
uniform system by which activities and events on the waters of
the United States would be adjudicated was such a matter of
concern to the Framers that they placed admiralty as among the
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powers of the newly-created federal government. See U.S.
COtqST.art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power "to
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
seas"). The Supreme Court addressed the importance of
uniformity in the maritime arena in Richardson: "The federal
interest in protecting maritime commerce ... can be fully
vindicated only if all operators of vessels on navigable waters
are subject to uniform rules of conduct ...." Richardson, 457
U.S. at 674-75; see also Sisson, 497 U.S. at 367 ("The need for
uniform rules of maritime conduct and liability is not fimited to
navigation,
but expands at least to any other activities
traditionally
undertaken by vessels.").
Uniformity,
as Yamaha fQrcefully argues, is a rather
strong concern in the instant matter. If we were to adopt the
District Court's holding that the substantive standards by which
an admiralty defendant's liability is adjudged is governed by the
law of the state in which the alleged injury occurred, there
would be no uniformity in such standards. Cf Ellis v. Riverport
Enterprises, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 105, 106 (E.D Ky. 1997)
(stating that" 'principles of federalism counsel that only when
the federal interest in uniformity outweighs other interests at
stake should admiralty jurisdiction
deprive the state of its
traditional control over personal injury claims.' "). Indeed, such
uniformity concerns informed the Moragne Court's decision to
overrule TheHarrisburg. SeeMoragne, 398 U.S. at 401 ("Our
recognition
of a right to recover for wrongful death under
general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal
policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies
that have
resulted from the necessity to accommodate
state remedial
statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts."
(emphasis added)).
govern

Accordingly,
we hold that federal maritime standards
the adjudication
of a defendant's (here, Yamaha's)
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putative liability in an admiralty action brought pursuant to a
state wrongful death/survival statute.x7
V
We conclude by summarizing our answers to the certified
questions:
1. Should punitive damages be determined by the law of
Puerto Rico? We have answered "yes," and in so doing, we
affirm the order of partial summary judgment entered by the
District Court on March 22, 1999.
2. Should compensatory damages be determined by the law
of Pennsylvania? We have answered "yes," and in so doing,
we affirm the order ofpattial summary judgment entered by
the District Court on March 22, 1999.
3. Is the law of puerto Rico to be applied to determine the

I_We note that we are not alone in setting forth the
above reasoning in the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in
the instant matter. Indeed, the Southern District of New York
has held that
the thrust of Yamaha [516 U.S. 199] is to argue that
considerations of uniformity in federal maritime wrongful
death action require only that standards of liability be
exclusively determined by federal maritime law and that,
once such liability has been shown, there is no antagonism
to such a policy in supplementing federal remedies with
those available under otherwise applicable state statutes.
07-1ara v. CelebrityCruises Lines, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 254, 256
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). The 07-1are court termed any indication in
Yamaha to the contrary as "Delphic." See id at 256 n. 1.
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liability of Yamaha? We have answered "no," and in so
doing, we reverse this portion of the order entered by the
District Court on March 22, 1999, and remand this matter
to the District Court for _rther proceedings
consistent with
this opinion.
Each party will bear its own costs.
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NYGAARD, J., concurring and dissenting.
I take little issue with most of the majority's carefully
crafted opinion. I do, however, respectfully part ways with its
choice of Puerto Rican law, and conclusion that the Estate of
Natalie K. Calhoun should be denied punitive damages.
As the majority correctly points out, a federal court
sitting in diversity applies the forum state's choice of law rules.
See Klaxon Co. v. StentorElec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
This requires that we weigh the interests of the jurisdictions
involved and consider how these interests are related to the
specific issues involved in the conflict. See Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S 571,582 (1953).
Contacts considered vital in determining the state of
most significant relationship include: place of injury, place of
conduct, domicile of the parties, and the place where the
relationship between the parties is centered. See Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws §145(2) (1971). The importance
of the respective contacts is determined, in part, by considering
the issues, the nature of the tort, and the purposes of the tort
rules involved, ld at §145 (comments c-f).
The District Court relied exclusively on the fact that
Puerto Rico does not provide punitive damages as part of its
damages scheme:
[The] purposes [of punitive damages] appear to be the
community purposes of the state or community in which the
tortious activity takes place. The fact that Puerto Rico does
not have a regime of punitive damages reflects a community
determination that Puerto Rico for its reasons does not think
that punitive damages are the instrument ... through which
it wishes to pursue ... punishment on the one hand and
deterrence on the other.
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Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291
(E.D Pa, 1999).
The District Court further opined that since the chief
purposes of punitive damages are to deter and punish, rather
than compensate the victims, the public policy of Puerto Rico,
a Commonwealth that has elected not to employ punitive
damages as an instrument of deterrence and punishment, should
govern as to this aspect of damages, instead of the public policy
of Pennsylvania. See id.; see also Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor
Corp., 1998 WL 717430 (ED Pa. 1998). However, under the
modern interest-analysis conflict of laws approach that is
followed by the majority of states including Pennsylvania, the
law of the state with the greatest interest in fimhefing the public
policy behind its punitive damages scheme should govern.
Puerto Rico has little interest in the outcome here. In
contrast, Pennsylvania's interest in the amount of recovery in
wrongful death cases is great. The Constitution of Pennsylvania,
Article III, Section 21 P.S. (cited in Griffithv. United Air Lines,
416 Pa. 1,203 A.2d 796, 807 (Pa. 1964)) states:
The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the
payment by employers, or employers and employees jointly,
of reasonable compensation for injuries to employees arising
in the course of their employment ***; but in no other cases
shah the General Assembly limit the amount to be
recovered for injuries resulting in death, orfor injuries to
persons or property, and in case of death from such
injuries, the right of action shah survive ***. (emphasis
added).
Punitive damages are appropriate
in Pennsylvania
when
the act committed,
in addition to causing actual damages,
constitutes "outrageous conduct," either through reckless

A31
indifference

or bad motive.

See McClellan

v. Health

Maintenance Org. of Pennsylvania, 604 A.2d 1053, 1061 (Pa.
Super. 1992); see alsoFeldv. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747-48
(Pa. 1984). We have held that three factors should be
considered when awarding punitive damages: (1) the character
of the act; (2) the nature and extent of the harm caused; and (3)
the wealth of the defendant. See Donaldson v. Bernstein, 104
F.3d 547, 557 (3d Cir. 1997)(cigng Kirkbride v. Lisbon
Contractors, Inc., 521 Pa. 97, 555 A.2d 800, 803 (Pa. 1989)).
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) (regarding
imposition of punitive damages adopted in Pennsylvania).
Here, the defendant, a Japanese corporation, (tortious
actor) defectively manufactured a jet ski in Japan (character of
act), the tortious act resulted in the death of a Pennsylvania
resident while tiding the defective jet ski (extent of harm
caused), and the defendant is a very large multi-national
corporation
(wealth of the defendant). These factors indicate
Pennsylvania's
interest in awarding punitive damages to the
Calhouns. They also evince Puerto Rico's little interest in the
outcome of the lawsuit. The fatal accident did not occur to a
Puerto Rican citizen, the plaintiff is not Puerto Rican, the
outrageous conduct was not committed by a Puerto Rican, and
the only connection Puerto Rico has is that the accident
happened to have occurred there. The District Court's reliance
on the "community purposes of the state in which the tortious
activity took place" is misplaced, because the "tortious activity"
at issue in this case -- the allegedly defective design and
manufacture
of the jet ski -- did not occur in Puerto Rico.
Rather, the jet ski was designed and manufactured
by a Japanese
corporation
in Japan.
The Supreme Court has held that punitive damages may
properly be imposed to further a state's legitimate interests in
punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.
See
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BMW of NorthAmerica, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). By
my analysis, Pennsylvania
has a more legitimate interest in
getting the punitive damages awarded for the wrongful death of
one of its residents than Puerto Rico has in protecting one of its
citizens from an excessive verdict by precluding the award of
punitive damages.
The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held that
compensation
of an injured plaintiff is primarily a concern of the
state in which the plalntiffis domiciled. Griffith, 203 A.2d at
806. The only interest of the state of injury would be in the
compensation
of those who rendered medical aid and other
assistance to the injured parties. Id. Where, as here, immediate
death occurs, the state has no such interest. Id. at 807. Thus,
under Pennsylvania
law, Puerto Rico has no interest in the
compensation
of this decedent's estate. Pennsylvania,
on the
other hand, has a very strong interest in seeing that one of its
residents is compensated under a wrongful death claim, and that
an outrageous
and tortious act be punished to deter the
defendant from continuing its behavior.
In my view, this result is consistent with Scott v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 979 (1968). In Scott, the following contacts were crucial
to our decision: the decedent was domiciled in Pennsylvania;
the
letters of administration
were granted by the Register of Wills
of Philadelphia
County; the decedent's personal property was
located in Pennsylvania;
the decedent's relationship with the
defendant began in Pennsylvania, and the defendant did business
in Pennsylvania. See 399 F.2d at 22.
The facts in Scott are very similar to the facts here: (1)
the decedent in Scott was in Boston voluntarily and Natalie was
in Puerto Rico voluntarily; (2) the decedent in Scott got on a
plane in Boston voluntarily and Natalie got on the jet-ski in
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Puerto Rico voluntarily; (3) the decedent in Scott was killed in
Boston and Natalie was killed in Puerto Rico; (4) the decedent
in Scott was a Pennsylvania resident as was Natahe; and (5) the
decedent's estate in Scott was settled in Pennsylvania, Natalie's
estate is to be settled in Pennsylvania, and Yamaha does
business in Pennsylvania,
including advertising and distributing
its products. In contrast, Puerto Rico's sole contact with the
incident in question is that Natalie's death occurred in its
territorial waters. Thus, under the ratio decidendi of Scott,
Puerto Rico (like Massachusetts in Scott), the state where the
accident occurred, has no interest in the outcome of the
litigation.
In LeJeune v. Bliss-Salem, lnc., 85 F.3d 1069 (3d Cir.
1996), a Pennsylvania resident was injured at his regular
workplace in Delaware. In Ledeune the cornerstone of our
conclusion that Delaware was not a fortuitous place of injury,
was the fixed location of the plaintiff's workplace, the regularity
of his presence there, and the fact that the majority of the
wrongful conduct occurred in Delaware. Neither Scott nor
Ledeune defines the concept of fortuity. However, as the
Calhouns argue and I agree, Natalie's brief vacation in Puerto
Rico is more akin to that of the plainf_ff in Scott than to the
status of the plaintiff in Ledeune who came to Delaware every
day to work.
Other Circuits provide some guidance. In airplane crash
cases, for example, the place of injury is much more fortuitous
than the place the defendant selects as his place of incorporation
and principal place of business or the place of misconduct. In In
re Air CrashNear Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 615 (7th Cir. 1981);
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981), the court held that the state
where an injury occurs has less interest in deterrence and less
ability to control behavior by deterrence or punishment than the
state where the plaintiff is domiciled or the state where the
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misconduct occurred. In La Plante v. American Honda Motor
Co., Inc., 27 F.3d 731. (1st Cir. 1994), the court applied Rhode
Island law to govern a products liability action brought by an
army mechanic stationed in Colorado against Honda in his home
state of Rhode Island for injuries sustained in Colorado while
operating a vehicle designed and manufactured by Honda. In
rejecting the law of the place of injury, the La Plante court gave
significant weight to the fact that the tortious conduct that gave
rise to the plaintiff's claim occurred not in Colorado, but in
Japan, where the car was designed, la_ at 741.
In Villaman v. Schee, 1994 WL 6661 at *4 (9th Cir.
1994), the court held that because Arizona tort law was
designed in part to deter negligent conduct within its borders,
Arizona had a stronger interest in the application of its laws
allowing for full compensatory and punitive damages than
Mexico did, whose limitation of tort damages, like Puerto
Rico's, was designed to protect its residents "from excessive
financial burdens or exaggerated claims." If the defendants in
this case were Puerto Rican residents, then Puerto Rico's
interest in protecting its residents from excessive financial
burdens might be somewhat compelling. However, Puerto Rico
has no resident to protect and I conclude it has no interest in
denying either punishment or full recovery to non-residents.
Although punitive damages may be the medium of
deterrence, the result and purpose of punitive damages is to
protect citizens. I would hold that the District Court erred by
concluding that the Calhouns' punitive damages claim is
governed by Puerto Rico law.
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OPINION
POLLACK,

District

Judge.

This case arises from the tragic death, in the offshore
waters of Puerto Rico, of Natalie Calhoun, the minor daughter
ofLucien B. Calhoun and Robin L. Calhoun. In the summer of
1989, Natalie, twelve, who lived with her parents in
Pennsylvania,
went on a vacation trip to Puerto Rico with a
friend and her friend's parents. During their stay at a resort
hotel, Natalie rented a "Wavejammer"
jet ski. The Wavejammer
hit a vessel at anchor near the beach. Natalie was killed.
Invoking Pennsylvania law, Natalie's parents brought a
combined wrongful death and survival action in this court
against Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd., a Japanese corporation,
which is the manufacturer of Wavejammer jet skis, and Yamaha
Motor Corporation, US.A, a California corporation, which is
the American distributor of Wavejammers.
(The defendants are
hereinat_er collectively referred to as "Yamaha"). The complaint
alleged defects in the Wavejammer,
and attributed liability to
Yamaha on the basis of negligence, strict liability, and breach of
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.
Plaintiffs contended that, since the parties were of
diverse citizenship, the suit Should be treated as a conventional
diversity action, to be tried under Pennsylvania
law in
conformity with the requirements of the Erie doctrine. Erie R.
Co. v. Tomplkins,304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188
(1938); Klaxon v. StentorElectric Manufacturing Co., lnc., 313
U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 LEd. 1477 (1941). Yamaha
contended that, since the suit arose from an accident occurring
in the territorial waters of the United States, the suit should,
notwithstanding that Natalie was neither a seaman nor a
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longshoreman (i.e., notwithstanding that she was not a
"seafarer"), be regarded as embraced by this court's admiralty
jurisdiction. More particularly, Yamaha contended that the suit
should, pursuant to Moragne v. States Marine Lines, lnc., 398
U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed. 2d 339 (1970), be treated as
a federal maritime claim. I concluded that Yamaha was correct
in arguing that the Calhouns' suit sounded not in diversity but in
admiralty. Pursuant to that jurisdictional ruling, I undertook to
fashion the cognizable damages claims in conformity with what
I determined to be appropriate and uniform federal maritime
standards. Specifically, I determined that-contrary
to Yamaha's
view-the Calhouns could undertake to sue for loss of Natalie's
society, but-contrary to the Calhouns' view-they could not sue
for Natalie's lost future earnings or for punitive damages. 1993
WL 216238, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8267 (E.D.Pa. 1993). At
the instance of the parties, these rulings were certified for
interlocutory review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
The Court of Appeals, in a detailed and closely reasoned
opinion, reversed, 40 F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 1994). Concluding that
this court had misconstrued Moragne and other pertinent
Supreme Court decisions in holding that a uniform federal
remedial regime was intended to govern litigation arising out of
allegedly tortious deaths of nonseafarers in territorial waters, the
Court of Appeals ruled that state remedial law was to govern
the Calhouns' suit against Yamaha. However, the Court of
Appeals left it to this court to determine, in the first instance, the
choice-of-law
question
of
which
jurisdiction's-i.e.,
Pennsylvania's
or Puerto Rico's-remedial
regime should apply.
The Supreme Court, on certiorari, affirmed in a
unanimous opinion. YamahaMotor Corp., U.S.A.v. Calhoun,
516 U.S. 199, 116 S.Ct. 619, 133 LEd 2d 578 (1996). After
reviewing its own major cases, including Moragne, and afl:er
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careful analysis of the interplay between its cases and three
major federal statutes-the Death on the High Seas Act, 46
U.S.C. § 761 et seq.; the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 et seq,;
and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. § 901 et seq.-the Court ruled that "taking into account
what Congress sought to achieve, we preserve the application
of state statutes to deaths within territorial waters." Id. at 216.
Then, said the Court, in the final paragraphs of the opinion, ".for
the reasons stated, we hold that the damages available for the jet
ski death of Natalie Calhoun are properly governed by state
law." Id.
The Court, in the op'mion'sclosing footnote, pointed out
that "the Third Circuit left for initial consideration by the
District Court whether Pennsylvania's wrongful-death remedies
or Puerto Rico's apply." Id at 216 n. 14
The opinion's closing footnote also identified a related
question whose disposition the Supreme Court-like the Court
of Appeals-felt could be deferred (id.):
The Court of Appeals also left open, as do we, the
source-federal or state-of the standards governing
liability, as distinguished from the rules on remedies.
We thus reserve for another day reconciliation of the
maritime personal injury decisions that rejected state
substantive liability standards, and the maritime
wrongful-death cases in which state law has held sway.
Compare Kermarec, 358 U.S. 625 at 628 [, 79 S.Ct.
406] (personal injury); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,
346 U.S. 406, 409[, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143]
(1953) (same), with Hess v. United States, 361 U.S.
314, 319[, 80 S.Ct. 341,4 L.Ed.2d 305] (1960)
(wrongful death); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S.
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588, 592-594[, 79 S.Ct. 503, 3 L.ED2d 524] (1959)

(same).
II.
As the foregoing recital explains, two questions were
remitted to this court by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court. The first question is which jurisdiction's
remedial
regime-that prescribed by the law of remedies of Puerto Rico or
that prescribed by the law of remedies of Pennsylvania-frames
the damages claims advanced by the Calhouns. The second
question is whether the source of the Calhouns' substantive
claims is federal maritime law or state law. If the second
question yields the answer that state substantive law governs, a
_rther question is presented: Is the applicable substantive law
that of Pennsylvania
(the home jurisdiction of Natalie Calhoun
and of her parents, and the jurisdiction in which this litigation is
being conducted), or that of Puerto Rico (the jurisdiction in
which Natalie's tragic death occurred).
The first of these questions was addressed by this court
last fall. After briefing and argument I announced a provisional
ruling-"provisional" in the sense that it was not then embodied

1The term "state law" is here used to denote the law of
Puerto Rico as well as the law of Pennsylvania,
notwithstanding
that Puerto Rico is, as a matter of formal federal terminology,
a "commonwealth"
rather than a "state." (Pennsylvania's
formal
seN-description as the "Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," in the
Preamble of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
is deeply rooted in
Pennsylvania's history, but it is, of course, a matter of local
terminology
which in no respect modifies or qualifies
Pennsylvania's status as a "state" for all federal purposes.)
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in an order. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Sept. 23, 1998.
At a subsequent hearing a week later I stated that, after giving
counsel the opportunity to file supplemental briefs, I would (1)
reconsider my provisional ruling (a ruling which, as I explain
below, was at odds with the position of the Calhouns and with
the position of Yamaha) on the question of remedies and (2)
rule on the question whether the Calhouns' claims are
substantively rooted in federal maritime law or state law.
Further, I expressed agreement with the joint view of the parties
that my rulings on these two questions (whatever those rulings
turned out to be) should bo certified to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
i.

My provisional decision on the question of the
applicability of Pennsylvania's or Puerto Rico's remedial regime
commenced
with a ruling that the question was not one to be
decided, Klaxon-wise, by reference to which jufisdiction's
remedial provisions would be applied by a Pennsylvania
Court
of Common Pleas invoking principles of Pennsylvania
conflict
of laws. Because this case is deemed an admiralty case, not a
diversity case, the question of whose remedial regime should be
applied was, in my view, a question of federal choice-of-law
law, not of state choice-of-law law. It seemed to me that for this
court to be guided by how a Pennsylvania tort case involving (a)
cognate claims and (b) parties of similarly diverse citizenship
would be handled by a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas
would be an invitation to a species of disuniformity in the
management
of maritime death claims that the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals could hardly have intended, since it
would mean that, if a case identical to this were brought in a
federal district court in Puerto Rico, the question of what
remedies were available would depend on Puerto Rico's choice-
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of-law rules which might well not be harmonious
Pennsylvania's choice-of-law rules.

with

In sum, I decided that whether Puerto Rico's or
Pennsylvania's remedial rules should govern was a matter of
federal choice of law which it was up to me to determine.
With respect to the Calhouns' claim for punitive
damages, I concluded that such a claim was not cognizable in
this case because Puerto Rico does not have punitive damages
as part of its conventional damages arsenal. Punitive damages,
I noted (Transcript, Sept. 23, 1998, pp. 35-39), are:
intended to punish an egregious wrongdoer [and] are
also intended to deter that wrongdoer and others from
engaging in the grievously tortious conduct that is at
issue. These two purposes appear to me to be the
community purposes of the state or community in
which the tortious activity takes place. The fact that
Puerto Rico does not have a regime of punitive
damages reflects a community determination that
Puerto Rico for its reasons does not think that punitive
damages are the instrument ... through which it wishes
to pursue ... punishment on the one hand and
deterrence on the other ....
In reaching this result I rejected the contention of the
Calhouns' counsel that the Puerto Rico situs of Natalie
Calhoun's death was "adventitious," and hence should be
disregarded for choice-of-law purposes-"adventitious" in the
sense that, in Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14, 28
(3d Cir. 1968), the fact that the airplane crash in which
Pennsylvania domiciliary Thomas L. Moody lost his life
occurred in Boston Harbor was deemed by the en bane Third
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Circuit to be "adventitious" and hence not to be given choice-oflaw weight. "Puerto Rico in our case," I said, "was not a place
of happenstance, it was a place to which Natalie Calhoun and
her [friend] and [her] friend's parents had gone for a number of
days of holiday. If there was tortious activity on the part of the
defendants, that activity reached its consummation in Puerto
Rico at the time of Natalie Calhoun's very tragic demise."
Transcript, Sept. 23, 1998, pp. 39-40.
Having determined that Puerto Rico's interest should
govern on the question of punitive damages, I came to a
contrary view on the question of compensatory damages
(Transcript, Sept. 23, 1998, p. 41):
It is Pennsylvania that must care for the Calhoun family
in their loss and must afford what compensation is
appropriate for the estate of Nataiie Calhoun. These
are matters of much more limited concern to Puerto
Rico.
Subsequent to my provisional ruling the parties have rebfiefed
the question. But the rebriefing has not materially altered the
terms of debate) I adhere to the view that the Calhouns, at the

X(A) Yamaha relies on Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
571, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953), as strengthening its
argument that the remedial law of Puerto Rico should govern
not only as to punitive damages but also as to compensatory
damages. But the case at bar is a far cry from Lauritzen v.
Larsen, which determined that Danish law, rather than the Jones
Act, should govern the fiability of the Danish owner of a ship of
Danish registry to a Danish crew member injured in the harbor
of Havana. Larsen, the plaintiff, signed the ship's articles in New
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York where he subsequently brought suit; the ship's articles
stipulated that Danish law governed the crew members' rights.
(B) Equally remote is LaPlante v. American Honda Motor Co.,
Inc., 27 F.3d 731 (lst Cir. 1994), relied upon by the Calhouns
to bolster their contention that all aspects of damages should be
governed by Permsylvanialaw. In LaPlante, a diversity case, the
First Circuit concluded that a Rhode Island court would have
applied Rhode Island's pain-and-suffering regime, rather than the
less generous Colorado pain-and-suffering regime, in a
catastrophic personal injury action arising out of an accidem on
a Honda "all-terrain vehicle"-more commonly known as an
ATV-that befell a Rhode Island domiciliary in Colorado. That
aspect of LaPlante is, of course, consonant with the Calhouns'
view-in which I concur--that Pennsylvania's compensatory rules
should govern the Calhouns' claims. However, when one
examines the other aspects of LaPlante that the Calhouns rely
on, there turns out to be, from the Calhouns' perspective, rather
less in LaPlante than meets the eye:
The Calhouns argue that LaPlante supports their contention that
Pennsylvania'spunitive damages provisions should apply to the
claims they are pressing in the case at bar. Although it is true
that in LaPlante the district court followed Rhode Island law,
not Colorado law, on punitive damages, the precise ruling of the
district court, which the First Circuit sustained, was that the
plaintiff had failed as a matter of law to establish a cognizable
punitive damages claim; whether there was dispute as to the
applicability, under Rhode Island choice-of-law law, of the
Rhode Island punitive damages regime does not appear.
Finally, the Calhouns point to LaPlante's statement that "the
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trial of their suit against Yamaha, may not seek punitive
damages but may assert whatever claims for compensatory
damages are available under Pennsylvania's law of remedies to
plaintiffs in wrongful death and survival actions.
ii.
The foregoing determination of which jurisdiction's rules
govern which items of damages addresses the first of the two
problems identified by the Supreme Court in the final footnote
of its Yamahaopinion. Next to be addressed is the second of the
two problems: determining "the source-federal or state-of the
standards governing liability, as distinguished from the rules on
remedies." 516 U.S at 216 n. 14. In identifying this problem, the
Court noted that it was "reser,ringfor another day reconciliation
of the maritime personal injury decisions that rejected state

tortious conduct allegedly giving rise to plaintiffs injuries
occurred in Japan, where the subject ATV was designed and its
warnings devised," 27 E3d at 741, in support of their argument
that, in considering the availability of punitive damages, no
weight should attach to the fact that Natalie Calhoun's fatal
accident took place in Puerto Rico. One could, of course,
fashion an argument that in some conceptual sense Yamaha's
allegedly tortious conduct had its situs in Japan, or perhaps in
Japan and California, but to say this would not appear to
strengthen the Calhouns' contention that Pennsylvania's
punitive
damages regime should be preferred to Puerto Rico's lack of
such a regime. The instructions of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court contemplate that this court is to look specifically
to the remedial law of Pennsylvania and that of Puerto Rico in
fashioning the applicable legal framework.
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substantive liability standards, and the maritime wrongful-death
cases in which state law has held sway." Id. The Court cited
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S.
625, 628, 79 S.Ct, 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959) and Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S. Ct. 202, 98 L.
Ed. 143 (1953) as prototypes of the personal injury/rejection-ofstate-law jurisprudence and Hess v. United States, 361 U.S.
314, 319, $0 S.Ct. 341, 4 L.Ed. 2d 305 (196C,) and The Tungus
v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 592-594, 79 S.Ct. 503, 3 LEd. 2d
524 (1959) as prototypes of the wrongful death/adoption-ofstate-law-jurisprudence.
For the purpose of deciding the issue now presented to
this court, what must be considered is whether the Supreme
Court has jettisoned the rule which in 1960, in itsper curiam
opinion in Goett v. United Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340, 80
S.Ct. 357, 4 L.Ed. 2d 341 (1960), the Court characterized as the
holding in The Tungus, supra, decided less than a year before.
According to Goett, The Tungus held that it is "a question of
state law as to what is the proper substantive law to be applied
in maritime torts within the territorial jurisdictions
of the States
in wrongful death cases." Goett, 361 U.S. at 342. The cursory
opinion in Hess v. United States, supra, decided on the same
day as Goett, was in accord.
As a conceptual matter, a determination
that The
Tungus, Goett and Hess are no longer good law-and,
accordingly, that federal law defines the substantive rights of a
claimant seeking redress for a death occurring in territorial
waters-would appear to accomplish the reconciliation of
personal injury and wrongful death cases adverted to by the
Supreme Court in Yamaha as a doctrinal goal the Court looks
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forward to achieving at some future time.3 Moreover, such a
determination
would, on a verbal level, harmonize with the
Court's ruling inMoragne, a case aris'mg in the territorial waters
of Florida which came to the Court ten years alter Goett and
Hess, and eleven years after The Tungus, "that an action does lie
under general maritime law for death caused by violation of
maritime duties." 398 U.S. at 409. 4
InMoragne--decided in 1970-the Court recognized that
a judge-made
federal cause of action for wrongfid death was
required in order to provide equitable treatment for claimants in
admiralty whose decedents had lost their lives within territorial
waters, rather than on the high seas, and who were not
adequately protected by the federal statutes covering those
engaged in maritime occupations, or by state wrongful death

_Ya.mahais not the first occasion on which the Court has
noted the tension between the doctrines applicable in personal
injury and wrongful death cases arising in territorial waters. See
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. at 395. Cf., The
Tungus, supra, 358 U.S. at 598 (opinion of Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
4Although "the Court's driving concern in Moragne" was
to "achieve [] uniform access by seafarers to the
unseaworthiness doctrine," Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 213 n. 10, the
Court in Yamaha noted that "lower courts have held that
Moragne's wrongful death action extends to nonseafarers," id.
at 210 n. 7, and "we assume, for purposes of this decision, the
correctness of that position. Similarly, as in prior encounters, we
assume without deciding that Moragne also provides a survival
action." Id This court is bound by those assumptions as law of
the case.
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statutes, s To reach that proper conclusion, the Court expressly
overturned The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30
LEd. 358 (1886), which had held that, in the absence of a
statute establishing a cause of action for wrongful death, no
such claim was cognizable in admiralty. The Harrisburg was an
incubus that shadowed the law of admiralty for almost a century
until it was repudiated byMoragne in 1970. The Tungus rests
squarely on TheHarrisburg. See The Tungus, 358 U.S. at 590592. And so the question arises whether the demise of The
Harrisburg, decreed in Moragne, necessarily entailed the demise
of The Tungus(and its pallid twin offspring, Goett and Hess) as
well.
Respected authority-the 1975 edition of the classic
admiralty treatise written by Charles Black and the late Grant
Gilmore-has answered the question in the affirmative: Moragne
"overruled both The Harrisburg and The Tungus (and its
sequels)...." Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law
of Admiralty (2d ed., 1975) 367.6

SAspointed out in footnote 4, supra, the Supreme Court
in Yamaha assumed, without deciding, that Moragne's
recognition of a wrongfiJl death cause of action would also
involve recognition of a survival action.
Sltis fair to say that The Tungus,Hess and Goett are not
decisions admired by Professors Gilmore and Black. The 1975
edition of the treatise, after describing the elaborate and arcane
divisions of the Court in The Tungus (five-to-four)
and Hess
(six-to-three), says of Goett (five-to-three-to-one): "The Goett
case, decided the same day as Hess, marked a descent into a still
lower circle of the Court's private jurisprudential
hell." Gilmore
Black, supra, at 367.
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However, in this fortieth anniversary year of The
Tungus, it now appears that reports of the demise of The
Tungus and its progeny have been exaggerated. "In the wake of
Calhoun [v. Yamaha]," maritime lawyer Walter Johnson has
written, "The Tungus, Hess and Goett have taken on new life."
Walter Johnson, Diving into the Wreck."An Exploration of
YamahaMotor Corp. v. Calhoun, 9 U.S.F. Mar. L. J. 141, 157
(1996). Mr. Johnson builds his case for this doctrinal
resurrection on the Supreme Court's Yamaha opinion, but the
evidence Mr. Johnson relies on is somewhat ambiguous. 7 More

The 1975 edition of Gilmore and Black was the second edition.
The first edition was published in 1957. Lamentably, there has
been no third edition.
7Citing footnote 10 of the Supreme Court's Yamaha
opinion, Mr. Johnson notes that, "significantly, the Calhoun
Court points out that Moragne could have overturned The
Tungus but did not." Johnson, supra, at 157. But Mr. Johnson
may have over-read the Yamaha footnote. What the first
sentence of the footnote says, in commencing a discussion of the
sweep of Moragne, is this: "The Court might have simply
overruled The Tungus ... thus permitting plaintiffs to rely on
federal liability standards to obtain state wrongful-death
remedies," 516 U.S. at 213 n. 10. This language does not have
to be read as signifying that Morague did not overrule The
Tungus. It may also be read as signifying that the Moragne
Court could have "simply overruled The Tungus" and leR The
Harrisburg (referred to in the Moragne text at footnote 10) in
force. The three sentences of footnote 10 which follow the
initial sentence, quoted above, explain why "training Moragne
solely on The Tungus" would not have accomplished
everything
the Moragne Court had in mind.
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compelling evidence is to be found in the Court of Appeals's
Yagnahaopinion. That court's opinion describes The Tungus as
deciding that "pre-Moragne fights of non-seaman killed in state
territorial waters depend on state wrongful death statute." 40
F.3d at 641. In a footnote, the opinion goes on to observe: "This
aspect of the holding of l'he Tung'us retains vitality postMoragne, for the Moragne Court 'concluded that the primary
sours of the confusion [in the law of maritime wrongful deaths]
is not to be found in The Tung'us,but in The Harrisburg,'
Moragne, 398 U.S. 375 at 378...
only the latter of which
Moragne accordingly overruled. Id at 409." 40 F.3d at 641 n.
39.
I conclude, therefore, that, certainly in this circuit, The
Tungus, with all its Harrisburg-era
warts, remains good law with
respect to the proposition that "rights of non-seaman killed in
state territorial waters depend on state wrongful death statute."
The substantive rights of those suing derivatively from, or in the
name of, nonseafarers killed in the territorial waters of a state
have their source in state law, not federal law. This conclusion
is mandated by the opinion of the Court of Appeals which-in
conjunction with the Yamaha opinion of the Supreme
Court-governs this case. This conclusion also appears to be in
harmony with the general receptivity to state law which infuses
Yamahaat both levels of the appellate process-in correction of

Mr. Johnson also observes that "the [Yamaha] Court notes that
Moragne left in place the cause of action for negligence under
Florida law." Johnson, supra at 157. The Yamaha Court did
indeed so note, 516 U.S. at 214. But whether the Moragne
Court could have addressed the viability of the negligence claim,
given the procedural posture of the case (see Moragne, 398
U.S. at 376-377, 378 n. 1), may well be matter for debate.
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my prior analysis.
The last question to be resolved is whether the state
substantive law to be looked to is that of Pennsylvania or Puerto
Rico. The answer to this is provided by The Tungus which
quotes (358 U.S. at 591) from the Supreme Court's opinion in
WesternFuel Co, v. Garcia, 257 U,S. 233, 242, 42 S.Ct. 89, 66
LEd. 210 (1921) as follows: "where death..,
results from a
maritime tort committed on navigable waters within a State
whose statutes give a right of action on account of death by
wrongful act, the admiralty courts will entertain a libel m
personam for the damages sustained by those to whom such
right is given." Since Puerto Rico is the jurisdiction "on [whose]
navigablewaters" Natalie Calhoun met her tragic death, it is the
substantive law of Puerto Rico which is the source of the rights
of Natalie's parents, Lucien and Robin Calhoun.
Conclusion
In the order accompanying this opinion, this court
directs that:
(1) with respect to the remedies that plaintiffs may seek, (a)
partial summary judgment is granted to Yamaha, 8 insofar as
Yamaha has moved to preclude plaintiffs from seeking punitive
damages against Yamaha, and (b) partial surstmary judgrnent is
denied to Yamaha insofar as Yamaha has moved to preclude
plaintiffs from seeking compensatory damages as authorized by
Pennsylvania law rather than as authorized by Puerto Rico law,
plaintiffs being entitled to sue for whatever compensatory

SAs noted at the beginning of this opinion, the term
"Yamaha" denotes both defendants.
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damages the Pennsylvania law of remedies authorizes in
wrongful death actions; 9
(2) plaintiffs'substantive liability claims have their source in
the law of Puerto Rico governing wrongful death actions;
(3) given that, in this court's view, there is "substantial
ground for difference of opinion" as to the legal principles
underlying the foregoing two numbered paragraphs, and
because, in this court's view, "an immediate appeal from the
order" embodying the foregoing determinations "may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation," 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), this court concludes that it would be proper to
recommend to the Court of Appeals that it exercise its discretion
to review these two intedocotory determinations. Specifically,
this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), certifies to the
Court of Appeals the following questions:
Natalie Calhoun, the twelve-year old daughter of
Lucien and Robin Calhoun, who are Pennsylvania
residents, was killed when the "Wavejammer" jet ski
she had rented, while on a vacation trip to Puerto Rico
with a friend and her friend's parents, crashed into a
vessel anchored in territorial waters just off shore.
Natalie's parents brought suit against Yamaha Motor
Corporation, a Japanese corporation which is the
manufacturer of Wavejammer jet skis, and Yamaha
Motor Co., Ltd., a California corporation which is the
American distributor of Wavejammers (the defendants
are hereina_er collectively referred to as "Yamaha"),

9The term "wrongful death actions" is to be understood
as including survival actions. See note 5, supra.
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in a federal district court in Pennsylvania. The
complaint, which alleges defects in the Wavejammer
Natalie Calhoun rented, sounds in negligence, strict
liability, and implied warranties of merchantability
and
fitness. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 40
F.3d 622 and the Supreme Court, 516 U.S. 199, 116
S.Ct. 619, 133 L.Ed. 2d 578, have concluded that the
Calhouns' suit against Yamaha, arising out of their
daughter's tragic death, is an admiralty suit arising
under the aegis of Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 26 L. Ed. 2d 339
(1970). Further, in considering what sorts of damages
the Calhouns may sue for, the two appellate courts
have concluded that the question of what damages may
be sought under this Moragne cause of action is a
matter of state law. But the two appellate courts did
not themselves undertake to decide what state's law
would govern: That question-involving a choice
between the remedial law of Pennsylvania and that of
Puerto Rico-was to be addressed, in the first instance,
by this court on remand. Similarly, the two appellate
courts reserved decision on what state's substantive
liability law was the source of the Calhoun's
questions now posed are these:

suit. The

1. Did this court err in deciding, on remand, that
partial summary judgment should be granted to
Yamaha, precluding any claim by the Calhouns for
punitive damages, on the ground that (a) the
availability of punitive damages should be determined
by the remedial law of Puerto Rico, the sims of the
tragic accident giving rise to the suit, and (b) the law
of remedies of Puerto Rico makes no provision for
punitive damages?

A53
2. Did this court err in deciding, on remand, that the
Calhouns' entitlement to seek particular categories of
compensatory damages should be determined by the
law of remedies of Pennsylvania, the state of residence
of Lucien and Robin Calhoun and of their daughter
Natalie, rather than by the law of remedies of Puerto
Rico, the situs of Natalie's fatal accident, and hence
that Yamaha's motion for partial summary judgment
should be denied insofar as it sought to preclude the
Calhouns from seeking compensatory
damages in
conformity with the law of remedies of Pennsylvania?
3. Did this court err in deciding, on remand, that the
jurisdiction whose substantive liability law is the source
of the Calhouns' claims is Puerto Rico?
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying opinion, it is
hereby ordered that:
(1) with respect to the remedies that plaintiffs may seek, (a)
partial summary judgment is GRANTED to defendants
(hereinat_er, "Yamaha") insofar as Yamaha has moved to
preclude plaintiffs from seeking punitive damages against
Yamaha, and (b) partial summary judgment is DENIED to
Yamaha insofar as Yamaha has moved to preclude plaintiffs
from seeking compensatory
damages as authorized
by
Pennsylvania law rather than as authorized by Puerto Rico law,
plaintiffs being entitled to sue for whatever compensatory
damages the Pennsylvania law of remedies authorizes in
wrongful death actions (the term "wrongful death actions" is to
be understood as including survival actions);
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(2) plaintiffs'substantive liabilityclaims have their source in
the law of Puerto Rico governing wrongful death actions;
(3) given that, in this court's view, there is "substantial
ground for difference of opinion" as to the legal principles
underlying the foregoing two numbered paragraphs, and
because, in this court's view, "an immediate appeal from the
order" embodying the foregoing determinations "may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation," 28 US.C. §
1292(b), this court concludes that it would be proper to
recommend to the Court of Appeals that it exercise its discretion
to review these two interlocutory determinations. Specifically,
this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), certifies to the
Court of Appeals the following questions:
Natalie Calhoun, the twelve-year old daughter of Lucien
and Robin Calhoun, who are Pennsylvania residents, was killed
when the "Wavejammer" jet ski she had rented, while on a
vacation trip to Puerto Rico with a friend and her friend's
parents, crashed into a vessel anchored in territorial waters just
off shore. Natalie's parents brought suit against Yamaha Motor
Corporation, a Japanese corporation which is the manufacturer
of Wavejammer jet skis, and Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., a
California corporation
which is the American distributor of
Wavejammers
(the defendants
are hereinafter
collectively
referred to as "Yamaha"), in a federal district court in
Pennsylvania.
The complaint, which alleges defects in the
Wavejammer Natalie Calhoun rented, sounds in negligence,
strict liability, and implied warranties of merchantability
and
fitness. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 40 F.3d 622
and the Supreme Court, 516 U.S. 199, 116 S.Ct. 619, 133
L.Ed.2d 578, have concluded that the Calhouns' suit against
Yamaha, arising out of their daughter's tragic death, is an
admiralty suit arising under the aegis of Moragne v. States
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Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339
(1970). Further, in considenng what sorts of damages the
Calhouns may sue for, the two appellate courts have concluded
that the question of what damages may be sought under this
Moragne cause of action is a matter of state law. But the two
appellate courts did not themselves undertake to decide what
state's law would govern: That question-involving a choice
between the remedial law of Pennsylvania and that of Puerto
Rico-was to be addressed, in the first instance, by this court on
remand. Similarly, the two appellate courts reserved decision on
what state's substantive liability law was the source of the
Calhoun's suit. The questions now posed are these:
1. Did this court err in deciding, on remand, that partial
summary judgment should be granted to Yamaha, precluding
any claim by the Calhouns for punitive damages, on the ground
that (a) the availability of punitive damages should be
determined by the remedial law of Puerto Rico, the situs of the
tragic accident giving rise to the suit, and (b) the law of
remedies of Puerto Rico makes no provision for punitive
damages?
2. Did this court err in deciding, on remand, that the Calhouns'
entitlement to seek particular categories of compensatory
damages should be determined by the law of remedies of
Pennsylvania,
the state of residence of Lucien and Robin
Calhoun and of their danghter Natalie, rather than by the law of
remedies of Puerto Rico, the situs of Natalie's fatal accident, and
hence that Yamaha's motion for partial summary judgment
should be denied insofar as it sought to preclude the Calhouns
from seeking compensatory
damages in conformity with the law
of remedies of Pennsylvania?
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3. Did this court err in deciding, on remand, that the jurisdiction
whose substantive liability law is the source of the Calhouns'
claims is Puerto Rico?
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BEFORE: BECKER, Chief Judge,
SLOVITE1L MANSMANN, SCIRICA, NYGAARD,
ALITO, ROTH, MCKEE, RENDELL, BARRY, AMBRO,
FUENTES, and GGARTH"Circuit Judges

The petition for rehearing filed by the Appellants in
the above-entitled case, having been submitted to the judges
who participated in the decision of the this court, and to all
other available circuit judges in regular active service, and no
judge who concurred in the decision having asked for
rehearing, and a majority of the circuit judges in regular active
service not having voted for rehearing by this court in banc,
the petition for hearing is hereby DENIED.
Chief Judge Becker and Judge Ambro would have
granted rehearing.
By the Court

United

States Circuit Judge

Dated: 01 AUG 2000

*Vote limited to panel rehearing only.

